The Effects of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor on India-Pakistan Relations

CPEC-and-India

The Chinese plan to invest $46 billion dollars in Pakistan to strengthen the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), announced by President Xi Jinping during his April visit to Islamabad, is remarkable for its size and scope. The plan has the goal of providing a direct link between the Paki5tani port at Gwadar and the city of Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and has sparked a flurry of commentary. The size of the plan far exceeds total U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2002 and dwarfs Pakistan’s generally paltry FDI figures. The decision by
China to make such a high-profile investment in its long-time partner is indicative not only of the enduring regional dynamic5 that have compelled the two countries’ alliance but also of China’s increasingly global ambitions. While the details of the CPEC have been discussed and debated at length, the geopolitical factors underpinning China’s decision to invest so heavily in its troubled neighbor merit further examination.

The “All-Weather Friendship” Close relations between China and Pakistan are certainly nothing new and are generally framed in terms of the two countries’ mutual rivalry with India. Indeed, this strategic triangle has been the greatest impetus for Beijing and Islamabad’s “all-weather friendship,” which extends to the diplomatic, economic, and military realms. China has proved to be a reliable alternative for Paki5tan to the United States in providing military assistance, including support for its nuclear program. The two states have collaborated on major infrastructure projects in Pakistan in the pa5t, including Gwadar Port and the Karakoram Highway—both of which will play essential roles in the proposed economic corridor. The Pakistan-China relationship, for all its rhetoric, is also increasingly uneven. For instance, while China i5 the number one source of imports to and number two destination of exports from Pakistan, trade with Pakistan accounts for a negligible portion of the Chinese economy. The gap between the two countries extends to popular perceptions: while a LOUIS RITZlhGER was a Bridge Award Fellow with the Political and Security Affairs group at the National Bureau of Asian Research. He holds an MA in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University.

NBR Commentary • August 5, 2015

the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis view China favorably (in part, at least, the result of relentless government campaigns extolling the strength of the two countries’ friendship), Chinese tend to view Pakistan with far greater ambivalence. Finally, while Pakistan remains stubbornly fixated on India and mired in internal strife, China is a growing world power with correspondingly global ambitions. This last dynamic is particularly important in understanding the motivations and goals of the CPEC project.

Project Goals
The motivation5 behind China’s promised investment in Pakistan are primarily threefold, in order of global relevance: providing economic support to a long-time ally and strategic hedge, facilitating trade, and building linkages to the west by which China can expand its influence. China’s most parochial motivation for the CPEC is to provide economic support to a flagging ally struggling with internal instability. Pakistan and China, as mentioned, have historically viewed each other as balances viS-a-vis their shared rival, India. Now, with the United States
explicitly turning its attention toward India to counter Chinese regional influence, and with India’s economy primed to grow, it is logical that Beijing would seek to apply a formidable counterweight. Pakistan’s previously announced purchase of eight submarines from China is a more overt manifestation of thls dynamic. The plan’s emphasis on energy project5, to which $37 billion is said to be devoted, is particularly pertinent for Pakistan, which has been struggling with an acute energy crisis for much of the past decade. Moreover, China has real cause to be
concerned about Pakistan’s susceptibility to terrorism and insurgency. Elements of China’s own Muslim Uyghur insurgency in its westernmost Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region are reportedly tied to extremist networks in Pakistan and use the country’s lawless western regions as a base of operations. Beijing hopes that a massive economic infusion will promote economic growth and stability both at home and abroad, while strengthening its struggling ally.
China’s second interest in the CPEC is its potential to diversify energy trade routes to and from the Middle East. In recent years, China has worked hard to develop linkages to the energy-rich Central Asian states as a way to reduce its dependence on imports through the Indian Ocean and South China Sea, regions where a strong U.S. naval presence could allow for blockades at choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca, in the event of a confrontation between the two powers. The CPEC intends to make full use of the Chinese-constructed and operated Gwadar Port, situated along
the Strait of Hormuz in Pakistan’s western Baluchistan Province, as the access point by which energy shipments could arrive and be sent through Pakistan via proposed pipelines, thus bypassing easily disrupted shipping lanes. The famed Karakoram Highway, linking Pakistan and China via the Karakoram mountain range, is also scheduled to be upgraded. In addition, China has agreed to pay for the Pakistani portion of the oft-delayed Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline. Indeed, the promise of a Chinese-built economic corridor likely played a central role in Islamabad’s decision to avoid antagonizing its energy-rich western neighbor by remaining out of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, de5pite a history of close military ties to Riyadh.
These reasons alone, however, do not justify such a massive investment in a single country facing as many challenges as Pakistan. China’s geopolitical goals are increasingly global, expanding beyond its immediate neighborhood, and the decision to announce its massive investment in the CPEC is a clear indication that Beijing views Pakistan as an important partner in meeting its ambitious economic and political goals. China view5 its investment in Pakistan, particularly its goal of a rail corridor between the two countries, as the “flagship project” of its “One Belt,
One Road” initiative. This initiative seeks to link China’s economic partner5 in Southeast Asia to Europe by means of overland and maritime trade routes, including key Middle East energy resources and emerging African markets. Pakistan, by virtue of its status as a long-term

2 NBR Commentary • August 5, 2015

ally and its geographic position linking western China to sea routes through the Middle East, Africa, and, perhaps most importantly, Europe, could serve as a central crossroad5 for Beijing’s expanding global ambitions. The potential for Gwadar to be u5ed in support of future Chinese naval operations is also very real, although the nature of this usage is the source of ongoing debate. Regardless, when viewed in the context of China’s broader strategic aims, it is clear that the ambitions behind the CPEC go far beyond strengthening bilateral ties.

Implications and Recommendations
The Chinese plan to invest an enormous $46 billion into the planned CPEC clearly has implications for U.S. policymakers, particularly when viewed in light of Beijing’5 apparent long-term strategic objectives. That being said, it is important that decision-makers understand that a plan of this scale inevitably faces equally significant obstacles, not least of which are Pakistan’s own deteriorating security environment and complex domestic political dynamics. Furthermore, the evolving regional landscape presents U.S. strategists with opportunities, as well as challenges, to
ensure that our interests remain protected.
For all of their fanfare, the announced investment projects face significant hurdles, including a fractured Pakistani political environment, in which an apparent change in the CPEC route has already sparked protests from local and provincial leaders in Pakistan’s underdeveloped western provinces of Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Given both countries’ penchants for opacity, corruption appears to be an inevitable challenge. Additionally, the fact that Chinese companies, employing primarily Chinese workers, will carry out many of the projects may only serve
to increase political resistance. While navigating political turmoil is not particularly unusual in a development context, the ongoing insurgency in Baluchistan, where separatists have targeted Chinese workers in the past, and Pakistan’s continuing struggle with Islamic extremist networks present an enormously challenging security environment. Pakistan’s early commitment to establish a 12,000-man security force to protect Chinese workers is an indication of the seriousness of the challenge. An attack on Chinese civilians by militants with links to Pakistan could throw a wrench in diplomatic relations, as it has in the past. That being said, even if many of the proposed projects are not completed (which is probable), the impact on Pakistan is likely to be significant—$46 billion is an enormous figure. More importantly for U.S. policymakers, however, is the message that the proposal sends regarding the sincerity of China’s intentions to utilize Pakistan as a means by which to expand its global influence. This obviously presents challenges for the United States—challenges that are best met by continuing to engage with regional partners (including India) and allies, while reaffirming commitments to bolstering the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific.
Improving U.S. relations with Iran, particularly now that a nuclear accord has been reached, could be an important element in promoting regional stability while building linkages across the South Asian subcontinent. As mentioned, China has already announced an agreement to build a natural ga5 pipeline from Iran to Pakistan, and Washington would be wise to engage with Tehran to work toward expanding energy trade between Iran, Pakistan, and India. Promoting energy linkages between South and Central Asia, in addition to the stalled Trans-Afghanistan pipeline, can be an important step toward reducing Central Asian reliance on Russian and Chinese markets by providing alternative markets for the region’s energy exports. Opening diplomatic channels in the region will also be vital to ensuring long-term stability in Afghanistan—an interest Beijing shares. China’s potential to play a role in facilitating dialogue between the Afghan Government and the Taliban was on display in recently reported meetings between representatives of the two parties in Urumqi.

3 NBR Commentary • August 5, 2015

Finally, although U.S. policymakers should not simply accept platitudes regarding shared U.S.-China interests at face value (as has been demonstrated, Chinese interests go far beyond Pakistan’s stability and economic growth), this does not mean that diplomats and defense officials should not explore areas of trilateral cooperation, including in the field of counterterrorism. The United States, however, must not be 5een as complicit in the unjust and counterproductive marginalization and oppression of China’s and Pakistan’s respective Uyghur and Baluch minorities. China’s planned investment in Pakistan is motivated by an array of factors, including strengthening a useful regional ally and building advantageous trade routes that bypass potentially hostile waters. Most importantly, however, is Pakistan’s utility in furthering China’s growing power ambitions. For U.S. policymakers, this will require further rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific, solidifying old alliances and building new partnerships while finding creative
methods to build regional linkages that support U.S. interests.

The views expressed are those of the author.

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NATIONAL SECURITY THROUGH CIVILIAN-BASED DEFENSE

National-Security-1

National Security for the Twenty-first Century

National-Security-2

ISLAMABAD’S NUCLEAR POSTURE: ITS PREMISES AND IMPLEMENTATION

National-Security-3

ADOPTION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT

 

The China-Pakistan Corridor: a transit, economic or development corridor?

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: an assessment of potential threats and constraints

Introduction

China and Pakistan have developed strong bilateral trade and economic ties and cooperation over the years. China has gradually emerged as Pakistan’s major trading partner both in terms of exports and imports. Bilateral trade and commercial links between the two countries were established in January 1963 when both signed the first bilateral
long-term trade agreement (Ministry of Finance, 2014:126). Under the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries – signed on November 24, 2006 and implemented from July 1, 2007 , Pakistan secured market access for several products of immediate export interest.’ Later, both countries signed the FTA on Trade in Services on February 21, 2009 that became operational from October 10 that year (Ibid).

According to statistics provided in Pakistan Economic Survey 2013-2014, the volume of trade between Pakistan and China has increased from US$ 4.1 billion in the year 2006-07 to US$ 9.2 billion in 2012-13, representing an increase of 124 percent. While China’s exports to Pakistan increased by one percent during this period, Pakistan’s exports increased by 400 percent from around $600 million in 2006-07 to $2.6 billion in 2012-13. As a result, China’s
share in Pakistan’s total exports has gradually picked up from four percent in 2008-09 to 10 percent during the fiscal year 2013-14.2

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is expected to further strengthen trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang emphasized the construction of the CPEC during his May 2013 visit to Pakistan (Tiezzi, 2014). The incumbent Pakistani government has also shown much enthusiasm for the project since then. The corridor will connect Gwadar Port in Balochistan (Pakistan) to Kashgar in north-western China, which will make Gwadar not only fully operational but also a significant deep sea port in the region.
Opened for operations in 2007, the control of Gwadar Port was transferred to China’s state-owned China Overseas Ports Holding in February 2013. Since then, Gwadar is undergoing a major expansion to turn it into a full-fledged, deep-water commercial port (South China Morning Posf, 2014). When the corridor is constructed, it will serve as a primary gateway for trade between China and the Middle East and Africa.3 The corridor is expected to cut
the 12,000-kilometre route that Middle East oil supplies must now take to reach Chinese ports (Ibid).

‘These include cotton fabrics, blended fabrics, synthetic yarn and fabrics, knit fabrics, home textiles like bed-linen etc, minerals, sports goods, cutlery, surgical goods, oranges, mangoes, industrial alcohol, etc.
2 For details see chapter 8 of Pakistan
Economic Survey 2013-2014 available at
<http://finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_l4/08_Trade_and_Payments.pdf>
The whole project is expected to be completed by 2030, whereas related short-term projects including motorways and energy projects are to be finished by 2017-2018.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Besides meeting China’s needs in energy and developing its far west region and upgrading Pakistan’s economy, the CPEC is expected to benefit the people of countries in South Asia, contributing towards maintaining regional stability as well as economic integration (China Daily, 2013).
As cited earlier, the CPEC is a comprehensive development program that entails the linking of Gwadar Port to China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang through highways, railways, oil and gas pipelines, and an optical fiber link. Major physical infrastructure to be built includes 2,700-kilometre highway stretching from Kashgar to Gwadar through Khunjrab, railways links for freight trains between Gwadar and Khunjrab linking to China and having
possible regional connectivity with Afghanistan, Iran and India, and the Karachi-Lahore motorway.
The project will also undertake the revival and extension of the Karakorum Highway that links Xinjiang with Pakistan’s northern region Gilgit—Baltistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.4 Besides physical links connecting Pakistan and China, the project also envisages establishing several economic zones along the corridor. Also, an Energy Planning Working Group of the CPEC has been established that will undertake fast-track implementation of power
projects related to the CPEC. Those projects of 21,690 MW power productions will be undertaken
with the assistance of China under the CPEC plan (Pokis/an Today, 2014).
This report assesses potential threats and risks that could affect the implementation of the CPEC project in terms of insecurity and violence that pervade Pakistan, internal political and economic constraints, and also global and regional geostrategic impediments. The purpose is to understand and evaluate Pakistan’s security, political and economic environment and regional geostrategic dynamics in the medium to long term to explore feasibility prospects for the corridor and also to manage potential threats, if any, that could hamper the implementation. Most
importantly, the report discusses the security aspect in detail in which the probability of threats vis-ñ-vis extremist militancy, nationalist insurgency and criminal violence are analyzed with the main focus on areas across Pakistan which will be traversed by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

1. Political and economic constraints

Although Pakistan regards China an “all-weather friend” and bilateral relations between the two countries have never been uneasy over the course of history, yet it is important to evaluate the variables that can affect Pakistan’s political and economic capacity and response to implement the elements of the larger CPEC project over longer periods of time. Important among these variables are:

l) Pakistan’s political stability and policy consistency; and

2) The present situation of Pakistan’s economy and future scenarios.

With regard to the first variable, a positive aspect is that there is almost consensus among Pakistan’s political parties on maintaining friendly relations with China which suggests that in principle there should be no major political impediment in the way of the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. With an exception of minor segments among nationalist parties in Balochistan,5 Pakistan’s regional parties look towards China in a
positive manner to preserve bilateral ties. Similarly Pakistan’s military 4 The highway was started in 1959 and completed in 1979.
Some Baloch nationalists believe that mega projects in Balochistan such as Gwadar Port are not providing due share or benefit to the Baloch people. In that context, too, it is not specifically an anti-China sentiment on their part rather it is their anti-mega projects narrative that makes nationalists aggrieved with Chinese involvement in Balochistan’s development projects.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor establishment, which is also a key stakeholder in policymaking processes in Pakistan, considers China a trusted and valuable partner in bilateral military, economic and strategic areas of engagement and cooperation. Every political party that comes into power in Pakistan holds frequent high-level meetings with the Chinese government to discuss the political and strategic prospects that are helpful in strengthening bilateral relations and cooperation. Nor have there been high-level bilateral exchanges of
military officials between the two countries less frequent.

Also, Pakistani and Chinese geostrategic concerns have historically remained largely converged around many common areas of strategic and bilateral interests. The relationship between the two countries mainly hinges on four shared areas of interest that include ‘economic cooperation, energy security concerns of both countries, shared internal security concerns, and largely converging geostrategic interests’ (Mezzera, 2011).

All these factors indicate that a change of government in Pakistan is less likely to reverse or halt the CPEC project as successive future governments are expected to maintain consistency in Pakistan’s foreign policy towards China and also policy on bilateral trade and economic engagement. For example, the incumbent Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government in Pakistan restarted the country’s political and economic engagement with China from the point where the outgoing Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)-led government had left it.

At the same time, as the revised alignment of the corridor, or eastern alignment which will be discussed at length later in the report, will not run through most parts of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) as initially planned, some analysts are of the view that it would be difficult for the federal government to muster political ownership for the CPEC project from all the provinces.6 As the new CPEC route will largely pass through Punjab, the political leadership of Balochistan and KP may view their provinces as being deprived of the development and employment opportunities the CPEC will bring with it. However, the government claims it has not abandoned the original western route, which will be constructed later, and that the decision to first construct the eastern alignment was based on financial and security reasons.

Apart from that, long-term political stability will be required in Pakistan to smoothly implement projects such as the CPEC. In the past, Pakistan has faced many phases of political instability and turmoil that weakened the country’s development roadmap and also affected policy consistency. It was a very promising development for the country’s political stability that a democratically elected government completed its five year term and a peaceful transition of power happened after the 2013 elections. But the current government now faces a political crisis after just 14 months of being in power. This crisis unfolded itself after two political parties – Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) led by Imran Khan, and Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) led by a religious scholar Tahirul Qadri – started their protests and sit-ins
in Islamabad on August 14. Apart from certain other demands, both parties demanded the resignation of the prime minister. While the former is a political stakeholder having representation in the National Assembly and also heads the coalition government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the latter had not contested the 2013 election and does not have considerable electoral strength. The PTI alleges the ruling PML-N of rigging in elections and demands fresh elections under a ‘neutral’ interim set-up. Nonetheless, the PAT advocates a new political system that ensures ‘true and participatory democracy.

6- Author’s interview with Fazlur Rehman, executive director, Pakistan Council on China, Islamabad, October 2014.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

The ongoing political instability has already caused huge losses to the economy besides distracting the political leadership from other matters of vital importance related to governance, terrorism, policymaking, and implementation of policies. Certain important visits to Pakistan of heads and officials from different countries and also international organizations including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were either deferred or shifted to locations outside Pakistan in the summer-autumn of this year.

As far as the second variable is concerned, economic growth and development are linked to political stability to a great extent. At present, Pakistan’s economic outlook, although not bright, seems positive and improving. On August 18, 2014, the IMF raised its growth forecast for Pakistan to 4.3 percent for the current fiscal year, up from 4 percent (Daily Times, 2014). In the absence of certain major political crises and policy breakdowns, it would be safe to say that the country’s economy is right on track and will improve gradually.

Put it another way, Pakistan can provide the required funds and facilities for the CPEC project over a longer period of time, if there is no major political conflict and no economic meltdown. The government has already allocated over Rs73 billion as the budget for the Public Sector Development Program (PSDP) to execute development projects under the CPEC during the current fiscal year. Most of it this will be spent on the construction of Karachi-Lahore motorway and connecting roads and for land acquisition and relocation of utilities (Zafar, 2014). But in the case of a prolonged political crisis and economic meltdown gripping the country, such yearly and periodic allocations for the project could be disturbed causing delays to the project outcomes beyond the set targets.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project needs about $32 billion of investment and loans for the project are expected to come mainly from Chinese banks and corporations. For that purpose, the Federal Minister of Planning, Development and Reform Ahsan Iqbal and Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif held several meetings on their three-day visit to China in July 2014 with the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission, National Energy Administration, China Development Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Exim Bank, and heads of the  Chinese corporate sector (Ibid).

Secondly, the corridor will be largely built on BOT (build-operate-transfer) basis. As a result of Chinese financing loans, the project will be completed by Chinese companies, especially state-owned enterprises in China. It is expected that the project will be financially viable for these companies because the revenues generated by the project through BOT-related facilities would cover its cost and provide sufficient return on investment. Under BOT
arrangements, Chinese companies will also receive concessions from the government to finance, design, construct, and operate the designed projects as agreed in the concession contract, or BOT. The government may also provide support for the project in form of provision of the land.

2. Geostrategic dynamics

The CPEC is part of China’ efforts meant to strengthen its trade and commerce connectivity with different regions of world. In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized reviving the ancient trade routes connecting China, Central Asia and Europe through developing three main corridors through southern, central and northern Xinjiang, which connect China with Russia, Europe and Pakistan (Jia, 2014). Also, the Chinese have recently increased focus on the Bangladesh-China-India Myanmar corridor that would provide China’s landlocked Yunnan province access to the Bay of Bengal (Chowdhury, 2013).

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to pass through While China’s prime focus in constructing these corridors seems to strengthen its trade and economic connectivity with countries in the region and beyond primarily to fulfill
its soaring energy needs and enhance exports, it is expected that Pakistan could emerge as a hub of commerce and trade in the region with the construction of the CPEC that would entail establishing several economic and industrial zones and physical road and railway links connecting Pakistan and China. As the corridor also anticipates having regional connectivity with India and Afghanistan-although it is still too early to comment whether the regional element of the CPEC will become operational or not—it could also enhance regional economic and trade cooperation, which in turn would contribute towards regional peace and stability.

Gwadar holds central place in the utility of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor because without making the Gwadar Port fully functional, it would be difficult for China to see the anticipated corridor as an energy corridor that appears as one of its main objectives behind the construction of the CPEC. Located near the Strait of Hormuz, which channels about one third of the world’s oil trade, Gwadar could play a key role in ensuring China’s energy security as it provides a much shorter route than the current l2,900km route from the Persian Gulf through the
Strait of Malacca to China’s eastern seaboard (Chowdhury, 2014).

However, there is the view that the construction of the CPEC will ‘place Gwadar on the matrix of intense geo-strategic competition’ (CPGS, 2014). It has been said that Gwadar will also put China and Pakistan in a strategically advantageous position along the Arabian Sea compounding already existing Indian concerns that stem from ‘China’s involvement in nearby ports such as Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Sittwe in Myanmar and Chittagong in Bangladesh’ (Chowdhury, 2014). One the other hand as India is also energy hungry it looks forwards to developing Iran’s
Chabahar Port. In October 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s cabinet decided to develop Chabahar Port, which many believe is central for India to open up a route to landlocked Afghanistan, where it has developed close security ties and economic interests (Daze, 2014a), and to have access to energy-rich Central Asian States.

While Gwadar is located in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, where a nationalist insurgency is rife, Chabahar is located in the Iranian province of Sistan-Baluchistan where unrest prevails as well mainly due to certain violent Sunni sectarian-nationalist groups operating in the district. If peace and stability is not achieved in Afghanistan after the drawdown of international assistance forces, and countries in the region,

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor mainly India, Pakistan, and Iran, engage in proxy wars, it could have some implications for internal security mainly for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran that could impact development projects.
Pakistan has blamed India in the past for supporting Baloch insurgents from Afghan soil. Similarly, Iran has concerns regarding Jundullah-a sectarian insurgent group based and operating in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province with free cross-border movement into and from Pakistan.
But analysts argue that while Pakistan has struggled to achieve security in Balochistan, Iran has the capacity to enforce its writ in Sistan-Baluchistan that suggests Chabahar could become functional earlier than Gwadar, if pursued by India and Iran fervently.

Nonetheless, China has devised a pro-active foreign policy vis-ñ-vis the Middle Eastern countries by using the United Nations as a platform to negate the ongoing war in the region (CPGS, 2014). As far as Iran is concerned, China wishes to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through peaceful political settlement. Moreover, when it comes to ties between Pakistan and India, China has played its part (Ibid). At the same time, for China, Pakistan’s geo-strategic position is very crucial as it serves as a window into the Middle East. Meanwhile, it has already expanded its trade, infrastructure and energy links with most of the Central Asian Republicans (Pakistan-China Institute, 2014). But insecurity and instability in Afghanistan are a major source of concern not only for China but also other neighboring countries including Pakistan, India and Iran. China is already the biggest economic investor in Afghanistan
with about $7.5 billion investment (Ibid). China has recently enhanced bilateral and trilateral efforts aimed at strengthening regional cooperation and coordination. It hosted the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process Beijing on October 31, 2014 with a view to promote security and stability in the Afghanistan, in
cooperation with its neighbors (Arif, 2014). China has also pushed the matter of Afghanistan’s future after the drawdown withdrawal to the top of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s agenda (Pakistan-China Institute, 2014).

While cooperation among all countries in the region, at least in terms of trade and economy, would be an ideal scenario with changing regional dynamics, there is a strong likelihood that persisting bilateral conflicts and an environment of mistrust will keep them polarized and part of alliances where Pakistan would certainly remain closer to China, with emerging regional dynamics having little impact on the construction of the CPEC and functioning of the Gwadar Port. But it still remains to be seen whether or not the CPEC and Gwadar could become instrumental in forging and enhancing regional coordination and cooperation, although they are designed to have regional connectivity with India and Afghanistan.

3.  Security-related threats

There are certainly security-related threats linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and while most might originate in Pakistan, the Xinjiang province in western China is also facing security threats from Uighur militants and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).
Uighur and ETIM militants have long sought shelter in Pakistan’s tribal areas along with the local militants. However, Pakistan’s security forces have fought foreign militants in North Waziristan Agency including ETIM and Uighurs in recent months with the commencement of the military operation Zarb-e-Azb which has also weakened the operational capacity of ETIM (Khan, 2014).
Furthermore, US drone strikes in various areas of FATA have also dented the group by eliminating a number of its leaders.

The security of the corridor is of crucial importance for Pakistan as well as China in order to further strengthen trade and development-related ties. It is feared that growing militancy will threaten the commencement of projects designed for the corridor. It will thus be a challenge for both countries to quash

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor militant groups and their fighters along and across their borders. China also expects assistance from Pakistan in this regard. The presence of local and foreign militants in Pakistani tribal areas usually generates pressure on the government, therefore affecting bilateral relations (Rana, 2014).

Militant groups in Pakistan are relatively less hostile to China when compared to America and its western allies, but at the same time, they have targeted Chinese citizens, workers and engineers in past. The Uighur militants’ links with the Taliban in FATA pose a major threat to Chinese interests in Pakistan. An Uzbek- speaking militant leader Mufti Abu Zar al-Burmi recently released a video message directing all Taliban groups to carry out attacks on Chinese embassies and companies and kidnap or kill Chinese nationals (Rehman, 2014). The second source of threat to security could be Baloch insurgent groups who are against mega-development projects in Balochistan, including Gwadar Port currently being developed by Chinese companies.
Thirdly, the militant-criminal nexus in certain areas also poses a threat to Chinese engineers, workers and citizens in the form of kidnapping and robberies. In the past, there have been many incidents of kidnapping and killing of Chinese citizens working and living in Pakistan.

This part of the report discusses the nature and level of potential security threats to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which can appear in different parts of Pakistan in form of protracted violence, terrorist attacks, kidnapping and criminal activities. The threat assessment for different regions-through which the CPEC will pass-is based on the frequency of terrorist attacks reported from these areas over the past few years, and also the presence of militant,
insurgent and criminal groups in those regions.

3.1 Geography of the CPEC

The CPEC is a huge project that will undertake the construction of highway and railway links running through most of Pakistan starting from Gwadar in Balochistan and culminating in Kashgar in western China, while passing through parts of Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces and Gilgit-Baltistan in northern Pakistan to reach the Khunjrab Pass and beyond to China.

Eastern alignment: Pakistan and China have decided to initially construct the eastern alignment of the corridor mainly due to two reasons: first, Chinese companies are reportedly willing to undertake the construction of the eastern alignment on a BOT (build-operate-transfer) basis, and secondly it is more secure compared to the western
alignment planned earlier. The eastern alignment will run through only a few areas of Balochistan and KP provinces where the security situation is more volatile compared to other parts of the country. This change in original planning earned some criticism from parliamentarians in these two provinces who thought the new alignment will deprive their respective provinces of development and employment opportunities that the CPEC brings (The News, 2014).
Senators from KP and Balochistan during a meeting of the Senate Standing Committee on Finance held in June 2014 said that the new corridor alignment [eastern] excluded many areas of their provinces and the new route largely passed through the Punjab (Ibid). The Federal Minister for Planning and Development, Ahsan Iqbal informed the senators that investors were unwilling to construct the western route on a BOT basis. He said the government had decided to construct the relatively more secure eastern route first with Chinese assistance and that it had not abandoned the original western route, which would be constructed later (Ibid).

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

The eastern alignment of the corridor originates from Gwadar, travels parallel to the Makran Coastal Highway eastwards (towards Karachi), and then after passing through parts of interior Sindh, and southern, central and northern regions of Punjab, it reaches Islamabad. From Islamabad, it extends to Haripur, Abbottabad, and Mansehra districts of the relatively peaceful Hazara Division in KP -this part of the corridor will also run through Muzaffarabad, the capital of Azad Jammu and Kashmir-and reaches Khunjrab after passing through Diamer and Gilgit areas in northern Pakistan. The corridor will also run through the Pamir Plateau and Karakoram Mountains. A link from Taxila through Peshawar and Torkhum will connect the eastern alignment of the corridor to Jalalabad in Afghanistan. Regional connectivity with India through the eastern alignment is designed to be provided through
the Hyderabad-Mirpurkhas- Khokhrapar-Zero Point link and the Wagha border, Lahore.

Western alignment: This was the original alignment which the government says it has deferred until the eastern alignment of the corridor is completed. According to the western alignment plan, the economic corridor (highway and railway) starts from Gwadar and runs through some southern and eastern districts of Balochistan (Khuzdar and Dera Bugti, respectively), and some districts in South Punjab to reach D.I. Khan in KP. From D.I. Khan, it further extends
to Islamabad and Abbottabad and from there onwards, the route is the same as in the eastern alignment. The western alignment will have an additional regional connectivity link to Afghanistan through Chaman and will connect to Iran through Quetta-Kho-e-Taftan link.

Karachi-Lahore Motorway: It will run from Karachi to Lahore through traversing interior Sindh (mainly Hyderabad, Dadu and Sukkur), and parts of south Punjab, including Raheem Yar Khan and Multan.

3.2 Potential security threats to CPEC in each geographical region of Pakistan

Pakistan faces diverse challenges to its security and stability, for instance, Taliban militancy in KP and the tribal areas, a nationalist insurgency in Balochistan, ethno-political violence in Karachi, growing religious extremism and radicalism, and the deteriorating law and order amid acts of terrorism and violence being reported from across the country almost on daily basis.

This prevailing environment of insecurity, militancy and violence can pose serious threats to the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. As the level and nature of this threat is not uniform, it is a positive aspect that the finalized eastern alignment of the corridor runs through parts of the country that are relatively more secure with few exceptions.

As China and Pakistan have decided to initially construct the CPEC along the eastern alignment, this section of the report assesses the security, law order situation and militant landscape of the regions through which the Gwadar-Kashgar Highway and railways will run, also including areas to be traversed by the Karachi-Lahore Motorway.

Gwadar and Makran Coastal Highway!

‘All data and statistics used in this section are taken from the Pak Institute for Peace Studies’
(PIPS) database on conflict and security (http://san-pips.com/index.php ?action=db&id=1), unless
otherwise stated.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Summary: Baloch insurgents pose the key threat in Gwadar and the coastal belt; the Taliban and sectarian militants have minimum presence in this rrgion. Baloch insurgents can carry out Ion intensi fi attacks targeting the CPEC- linked installations and infrastructure and workers besides attempts at kidnappin gs. The level of threat is medium, Dnd needs sfringenf security meftsores.

The 653 kilometers long Makran Coastal Highway extends towards the east to link Gwadar with Karachi. This is where the Balochistan part of the CPEC will originate from and run similarly towards Karachi. Security threats to the construction of the CPEC and workers can also appear from neighboring northern districts of Gwadar and Makran Coastal Belt, e.g. Kech, Awaran and Lasbela. As the militant landscape of these districts is largely linked to that
of Panjgur and Khuzdar, too, it is pertinent to assess the security situation of this entire region spread over 6 districts.

A review of reported terrorist attacks between 2007 and July 2014 suggests that Kech and Khuzdar are the most volatile districts in this region. {See ChDrt 1) A worrisome factor is that Gwadar shares boundaries with Kech, a district where the activities and influence of Baloch insurgents has increased over the past few years. On the whole, 1,040 terrorist attacks took place in these six districts between 2007 and July 2014, representing 23 percent of
total attacks reported from Balochistan during that period. In other words, 23 percent of total terrorist attacks reported from Balochistan between 2007 and July 2014 were concentrated in six districts of Gwadar, Kech, Awaran, Panjgur, Lasbela and Khuzdar.

Targets hit in most of these attacks included security forces, civilians, political leaders, non-Baloch settlers and workers, gas pipelines and power pylons, railways tracks, and government installations and property etc.

Violent religious/sectarian and militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and the Tehreek-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or its Balochistan chapter Tehreek-e-Taliban Balochistan (TTB) have very little presence and operational activities in Gwadar, Kech, Awaran and Lasbela, four districts that will have immediate proximity with the CPEC alignment. But religious extremist and violent sectarian groups have enhanced their presence and activities in Khuzdar that lies towards north of Lasbela and Awaran districts.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

— That means the immediate threat to the CPEC in Balochistan is less likely to come from the Taliban or associated groups and sectarian groups such as LeJ due to their minimum presence in Gwadar and its immediate neighborhood. Another reason is the fact that such development projects have not been prime targets for religious extremist and sectarian groups.

However, most of the insecurity in terms of terrorist attacks and threat of kidnapping in Gwadar, Makran Coastal Belt and neighboring districts emanates from Baloch insurgent groups, mainly the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and Lashkar-e-Balochistan (LB) while the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Republican Army (BRA) are also occasionally found involved in insurgent attacks reported from these four districts.

The BLF, led by Dr. Allah Nazar Baloch, is predominantly focused in the southern coastal Makran belt although it operates across Balochistan. The group represents disgruntled middle-class and lower middle-class Baloch youths. The LB led by Javed Mengal is concentrated in south-western districts of Balochistan (Panjgur, Gwadar, Kech, particularly Turbat) and also Khuzdar. It is suspected that the group was involved in terrorist attacks on the Chinese
Consulate in Karachi and a blast at the Lahore Railway Station in August 2012 (PIPS, 2013). The BLA and BRA are also active in parts of Gwadar and its neighboring districts particularly Panjgur and Kech.

As far as the security situation of Gwadar district and Gwadar coastline is concerned, the frequency of terrorist attacks in these areas in quite low compared to other regions of Balochistan. From 2011 onwards, Baloch insurgents have hit different targets in Gwadar at an average of nine attacks in 2013 or less than one attack a month. These targets range from security forces including Gwadar coast guards, non-Baloch settlers, state installations,
public and private property, and political leaders and workers etc.

— The drug peddlers, human traffickers, and criminal groups are also present in Turbat, headquarters of Makran Division, and parts of Gwadar. Also, the growing nexus of Baloch insurgents with Taliban-like groups and criminal networks has the potential to increase the overall security threat for Gwadar and its neighborhood. To curtail such a threat it is necessary to counter the Taliban, sectarian groups and criminals from across Balochistan so that they are not able to expand their outreach to Gwadar region.

Karachi and interior of Sindh*

Summary: The level of threat is medium in Karachi and very low in the interior parts of Sindh. With the presence of large numbers o/ militant, sectarian extremists and criminal elements in Karachi, there is a probability Of DttDCkS OH engineers and workers o/ the CPEC-related proJec/s and also security personnel deployed to provide security to the project sites and workers. Incidents of kidnapping too cannot be ruled out.

A security analysis of major areas of Sindh along the eastern alignment through which Gwadar-Kashgar highway and railways and Karachi-Lahore motorway will run reveals that major threats can emerge from Karachi whereas the level of threat in the interior of Sindh is quite low.

8Al1 data and statistics used in this section are taken from the Pak Institute for Peace Studies’
(PIPS) database on conflict and security (http://san-pips.com/index.php? action=db&id=1), unless
otherwise stated.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Between 2007 and July 2014, as many as 962 terrorist attacks took place in areas of Sindh through which the CPEC and Karachi-Lahore Motorway will run. Most of these attacks, 889, occurred in Karachi alone. Among 31 attacks reported from Hyderabad, most were low-intensity attacks carried out by Sindhi nationalists and others.

Most of these attacks targeted security forces and law enforcement agencies, civilians, Shia and Sunni religious communities, and political leaders and workers. A few attacks also targeted NATO supply vehicles. A considerable number of low-intensity attacks also hit railway tracks and trains, mainly in interior parts of Sindh.

Chart 2: Terrorist attacks in parts of Sindh where CPEC-linked projects will run (January 1,
2007-July 31, 2014)

Karachi has become hub of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and associated groups and sectarian militants such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Muhammad. While sectarian groups are largely engaged in sectarian violence-with an exception of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi that is also engaged in terrorist attacks on security forces and other targets being a key ally of TTP-most of the terrorist attacks including high profile are carried out by the TTP and associated
groups.

The ongoing security operation in Karachi has failed to break the network of militants in the city. Reports also suggest that criminals were mainly targeted in security forces’ surgical strikes going on in the city for several months now. There is dire need to launch a comprehensive operation against militants in Karachi because the TTP and its allies including foreign militants are well entrenched in the city, more than what is usually thought, mainly in areas of Gadap, Sultanabad, Gulshan-e-Buner, Manghopir, Sohrab Goth, Mauripur, Musharraf Colony, Usmanabad,
Steel Town, Sultanabad, and Orangi Town. The brazen attack on cargo terminal of Karachi airport in June this year provides enough evidence to suggest how militants have established their network and strengthened their operational capabilities in Karachi. It also highlights lapses in the state’s security and intelligence infrastructure.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

— Also, Karachi can become more vulnerable after the military operation has been launched in North Waziristan. Taliban militants based in Karachi along with Sunni sectarian groups will be more than happy to welcome their fellow Taliban militants fleeing from North Waziristan.

— As far as parts of interior Sindh are concerned, in recent years religious extremism has been reported to be gradually rising there. The increasing incidents of persecution of religious minorities there suggest that interior Sindh, which historically and traditionally has been a land of peace and pluralism, is not safe anymore from the
onslaught of religious extremism and radicalism. Although the frequency of terrorist attacks has been quite low in interior parts of Sindh, yet few high profile attacks were reported from there in recent past including a lethal suicide-and-gun attack by a group of five militants on the regional headquarters of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Sukkur in July 2013.

— While the presence and activities of militant groups have been quite low in parts of interior Sindh, through which the CPEC will run, threat to security of these areas has been gradually rising from Sindhi nationalist groups mainly Sindhu Desh Liberation Army. Sindhi nationalists have carried out some low intensity cracker attacks in recent months and years targeting state infrastructure such as railway tracks but their operational capacity and organizational strength are too weak to cause some heavy damage. Hence the threat from nationalists to security of interior parts of Sindh also remains low that can be easily managed with stringent security measures.

PunJab and Rawa Ipindi-lslamabad9

Summary: The overall threat level is low in those parts of Pun)ab and Islamabad from u›here the CPEC corridor will pass. Hornier sporadic incidents of violence including against the project-related fargefs such as sites, engineers, workers and security personnel cannot be ruled out completely. It is imperative to eliminate TTP’s sflpporf structures in Pen/afi to present high value and high intensity attacks in future.

Over the past eight years, starting from 2007, Lahore and Islamabad-Rawalpindi have faced maximum terrorist attacks and casualties compared to other regions of Punjab through which the CPEC-linked roads and railway links will pass. However, sporadic attacks have also been reported from other areas as illustrated in Chart 3.

Chart 3: Terrorist attacks in parts of Punjab and Islamabad where CPEC-linked projects will run
(January 1, 2007-July 31, 2014)

All data and statistics used in this section are taken from Pak Institute for Peace Studies’
(PIPS) database on conflict and security (http://san-pips.com/index.php? action=db&id=1), unless
described otherwise.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Targets for most of these attacks were security forces, civilians, and Shia and Sunni communities. Some attacks were also aimed at political leaders and workers, private property and NATO supply vehicles. A spree of terrorist attacks including lethal suicide attacks gripped Lahore and Islamabad-Rawalpindi after the 2007 Red Mosque siege and that continued for 2 to 3 years. Even after that time period, high intensity attacks have been reported in few other
cities of Punjab.

— The TTP has support structures in parts of Punjab in the form of groups like LeJ and also some Deobandi madrassas. These support structures have helped the TTP in past to carry out lethal attacks in the heart of Punjab, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad. But strong vigilance and surveillance of security and law enforcement agencies in Punjab have denied the TTP permanent operating bases or safe heavens. That keeps the security threat to the CPEC-linked projects and personnel in Punjab low.

— Secondly, the eastern alignment of the CPEC will run through those parts of Punjab which are relatively safer and tactically difficult for the free movement and entrenchment of militants. For instance, the CPEC alignment in southern Punjab (Raheem Yar Khan, Bahawalpur and Multan regions) will be located towards the east of the Indus
River and will be least vulnerable to security threats that could emerge from the western side of the River Indus. To the west of Indus certain areas are the hub of extremist groups and criminals gangs (D.G. Khan and Rajanpur, respectively) but also serve as districts where militants from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa are found as it is the simplest entry- point into Punjab —
D.G. Khan through the Indus Highway and link roads is the route used. Also, to the west of the Indus, there is the presence of criminal elements, mainly in Kacha area of Rajanpur, an area that lies between the River Indus and the Indus Highway. These criminals reportedly have formed a nexus with LeJ and have been found involved in kidnapping and road robberies.

Areas in central and northern Punjab parts of the CPEC alignment are even relatively safer than south Punjab. Although Chart 3 displays a large number of terrorist attacks reported in Lahore and Islamabad-Rawalpindi between 2007 and July 2014, as mentioned earlier these cities were specifically targeted in the aftermath of Red Mosque operation of 2007. Also, most of these attacks were

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

orchestrated from outside and  terrorist infrastructures have minimal presence in these cities, although operational support exists. Another factor to be noted is that development projects and infrastructure schemes have hardly remained targets for militants in these and other cities of Punjab.

— Although it appears that security threats to the CPEC project in Punjab will be low and minimal, it is also important that militants have the capacity to orchestrate high value and high intensity attacks in those areas of Punjab from where the CPEC road and railway links will pass. It is imperative to ensure that the tribal militants’ support structures in Punjab are eliminated and strong surveillance and vigilance is maintained to prevent any major terrorist attacks. Police and intelligence agencies have a major role to play here.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and UK’

Summary: The threat level for the CPEC alignment in fhis region iS ftfso low because the Hazara Division o/ KP is relatively more secure and safer com militancy than other parts o/ the province. However, local Taliban militants in Mansehra, some of them linked with the TTP, could pose a security threat to u›orkers and engineers associated with the CPEC.

Parts of KP through which the CPEC will travel (Haripur, Abbottabad, and Mansehra) have traditionally been least violent when compared to other regions of the province. The presence of militant groups is also low in these areas, with the exception of Mansehra where local Taliban groups are operational but with minimum capacity to carry out major attacks without help and support from outside terrorist groups. Between 2007 and July 2014, as many
as 4,732 terrorist attacks took place in KP and only 52 of these attacks, or l percent, occurred in the three districts of Haripur, Abbottabad and Mansehra. Also most of these 52 attacks were concentrated in Mansehra alone; 4 in Abbottabad and 2 attacks took place in Haripur, respectively. (See Chart 4)

 

Chart 4: Terrorist attacks in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where CPEC-linked projects will run (January 1, 2007-July 31, 2014)

‘ All data and statistics used in this section are taken from Pak Institute for Peace Studies
(PIPS) database on conflict and security (http://san-pips.com/index.php? action=db&id=l), unless
otherwise stated.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

As mentioned earlier, local Taliban militants in Mansehra, some of them linked with the TTP, can pose a degree of threat to workers and engineers with the CPEC, but the probability and intensity of such a threat is low.

— Abbottabad and Haripur have remained largely isolated from Taliban militancy in the province. However, the Taliban in the past have tried to make inroads into these areas. For instance, in September 2007, an attack on army’s mess building in Haripur had killed 20 soldiers.
Since no major terrorist attack has been reported from these two districts. Strict security measures are required to keep the TTP and other militants away from this region, and also to counter any threats that might be posed by local Taliban and extremist groups.

This part of the CPEC will also be linked to Muzaffarabad, capital of Azad Kashmir. Muzaffarabad has also remained peaceful over the years with the exception of a few attacks in the past; only three terrorist attacks occurred in the city between 2007 and July 2014, all in 2009. One of these attacks was a sectarian-related suicide attack that claimed 10 lives and injured 81 others. Another suicide attack had targeted am army barracks killing two soldiers, while the
third attack was a low intensity cracker blast that killed one person. 2009 was the year when reports started to appear in the media that the TTP was trying to make inroads into Muzaffarabad, but since then no such attacks have been reported; nor have any reports surfaced describing the TTP’s presence in the region.

Diomer and Gilgit!

Summary: The region has seen plenty of sectarian violence in past. Some high intensity attacks in recent years on security/forces and foreigners also revealed TTP and other militants’ outreach to these areas. However, the absence of militant bases and support sort/ores in Gilgit end Boffistan suggests the threat level to the CPEC in this region will below. However, sporadic attacks on the CPEC-linked sites and QC£SOt2Ne/ can not be ruled out.

” All data and statistics used in this section are taken from Pak Institute for Peace Studies”
(PIPS) database on conflict and security (http://san-pips.com/index.php? action=db&id=l), unless
described otherwise.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

After passing through parts of KPK and Azad Kashmir as described earlier, the CPEC will run through Diamer and Gilgit districts of Gilgit-Baltistan. Sporadic terrorist attacks from the region in recent years, aimed at high value targets, attracted global attention and also raised concerns that Pakistani militants, mainly the TTP, in collaboration with the ETIM and Chinese Uighur militants would attempt to entrench themselves in this region. Other than
that most violent incidents reported from this region have been sectarian-related.

A total of 74 terrorist attacks were reported from Gilgit-Baltistan between 2007 and July 2014 – 7l from Diamer and Gilgit alone – out of which 55 were sectarian-related and only 16 were carried out by the TTP and associated militants and other groups. (See Chart 5)

Chart 5: Terrorist attacks in parts of Gilgit-Baltistan where CPEC-linked projects will run (January 1, 2007-July 31, 2014)

On June 23, 2013, militants killed 11 people including nine foreign tourists and two Pakistanis at Nanga Parbat tourists’ base camp near Bunar Nullah. The TTP spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan told media representatives through telephone calls that the group’s faction named Junud-e-Hafsa had carried out the brutal attack. He further said the killings were in revenge for US drone attacks and the killing of TTP chief, Waliur Rehman Mehsud (Khan, 2013). The Diamer attack also revealed that the nexus of the TTP, Al-Qaeda and the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) could pose as a threat to Pakistan’s internal security and also that of China’s Xinjiang province.

— Later on August 6, 2013, three security force officials, including an army colonel, a captain and the Superintendent of Police in Diamer were shot dead in Chilas City (the district headquarters of Diamer) by the TTP militants. These officials were investigating the Nanga Parbat incident and the killing of foreign tourists by the militants (The News, 2013).
— On July 4, 2014, over three dozen militants wearing Pakistan Army uniforms stormed a police station in Diamer district. They took away 10 guns, three pistols, thousands of rounds, wireless telephone sets, police uniforms and other police personnel belongings (Damn, 2014b). Locals from Diamer suspected these attackers were associated with Taliban militants.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

3.3 The state’s capacity and responses to maintain security and law and order Pakistan has the required capacity and security infrastructure to deal with potential threats to the CPEC project. The country has a huge security and law enforcement infrastructure comprising military, paramilitary including Rangers and FC, police and local
police forces such as the Khasadar force in FATA and Levies force in Balochistan. Additionally,
it has strong professional intelligence agencies. Sufficient sources and equipment for security, law enforcement and intelligence agencies would imply better standard. But with the threat of terrorism being non-conventional and asymmetrical, Pakistan needs more stringent efforts to deal with this threat.

Tribal militants against whom the Pakistani army has launched several military operations in the past, including latest military operation, Zarb-e-Azb – launched on June 15, 2014 in North Waziristan that is ongoing -would suggest a policy of containment of militancy, but much needs to be done in this regard. Initial reports following the launch of the military operation in North Waziristan suggested that foreign militants mainly those from Central Asia and
China were prime target of military strikes. Several militants belonging to ETIM and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)-both groups along with the TTP have close links with Chinese Uyghur militants-have been killed in the military operation so far. The government and army have vowed to clear North Waziristan of all militants including local and foreign, so there is hope that these foreign militants from Central Asia and China will no more find sanctuaries and shelter. Some reports suggest many of them have already relocated to either Afghanistan and elsewhere or other parts of FATA and Pakistan. However, it has been established that many of their ’hideouts’ in Waziristan have been destroyed. This will certainly reduce security threats for the CPEC project emanating from FATA.

As far as Balochistan is concerned, the province is already under strict security scrutiny in the presence of the Frontier Constabulary, police and Levies. In recent months, attacks by ationalist insurgents and militants have decreased. The state’s security apparatus in Balochistan, if utilized effectively, is capable to deter any threats to CPEC-linked projects and activities.

However, there is an immediate need to address security problems in Karachi, which is a complex city where militants find many weak spots and spaces to hide, recuperate, recruit, plan and operate. The Rangers and police have carried out security operations in the city, but there is need to expand scope of this operation to eliminate all sorts of militants.

Law enforcement agencies, mainly the police can handle the security of the CPEC alignment in Punjab, Islamabad, KP and also Gilgit-Baltistan with the help of intelligence agencies. Coordination among different security, law enforcement and intelligence agencies will be vital to secure the route, construction and workers of the CPEC project.

Provincial police departments can take pre-emptive steps to ensure the security of Chinese engineers and others working on the CPEC-related projects. Some precedents were set in the recent past. For instance, the Lahore City Police established eight special security desks around the city in June 20l4for Chinese citizens employed in government, semi-government and private sectors (Express Trihone, 2014).

4. Conclusion

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Long-term political stability in Pakistan is vital to smoothly implement the projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. In the past, Pakistan has gone through phases of political instability and turmoil that weakened the country’s development roadmap and also affected policy consistency. Similarly, if now or later, some prolonged political crisis and economic meltdown grip the country, the yearly and periodic budget allocations for the CPEC
project could be disturbed causing delays to the project outcome beyond set targets.

Although the prevailing environment of insecurity, militancy and violence in Pakistan can pose serious threats to the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the level and nature of this threat is not uniform across Pakistan. It is encouraging that the areas through which the finalized eastern alignment of the corridor will run are relatively more secure than those of the earlier planned western alignment, though with few exceptions.
The level of threat to the security of the CPEC project, including sites and personnel, is low along most areas of eastern alignment with the exceptions of Gwadar, the Makran Coastal Belt and Karachi, where threat level is assessed to be medium. At the same time, it is imperative to ensure stringent security measures along the entire CPEC alignment.

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The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

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The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

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The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

 

An assessment of potential threats and constraints.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Eleanor Albert                                                                        October 14, 2015

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)is an intergovernmental organization composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan founded in Shanghai in 2001. Originally formed as a confidence-building forum to demilitarize borders, the organization’s goals and agenda have since broadened to include increased military and counter terrorism cooperation and intelligence sharing. The SCO has also intensified its focus on regional economic initiatives like the recently announced integration of the China-ledSilk Road Economic Beltand the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. While some experts say the organization has emerged as an anti-U.S. bulwark in Central Asia, others believe frictions among its members effectively preclude a strong, unified SCO.

Originally organized as the Shanghai Five in 1996, the organization added Uzbekistan in 2001 and renamed itself the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The six member states occupy territory that accounts for three-fifths of the Eurasian continent and have a population of 1.5 billion, a quarter of the world’s population. In addition to the six member states, the SCO has two new acceding members, Indian and Pakistan, four observer nations , and six dialogue partners.

As laid out in its charter, the organizationfunctions as a forumto strengthen confidence and neighborly relations among member countries and promote cooperation in politics, trade, economy, and culture to education, energy, and transportation. The SCO has two permanent headquarters, the secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent, the Uzbek capital. One of the organization’s primary objectives is promoting cooperation on security-related issues, namely to combat the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. The organization adopts decisions made byconsensus, and all member states must uphold the core principle of non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs.

As a young organization, the SCO’s regional influence remains limited. Richard Weitz, senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, writes that the SCO and its main organizational bodies are “chronically underfundedand have limited powers to take decisions independently of their member governments.” Member states’ penchant for pursuing “micro-agendas” alsounderminesgroup cohesion and sows mistrust, says Matthew Crosston, professor and director of the International Security and Intelligence Studies Program at Bellevue University.

Despite these challenges, the SCO has nevertheless broadened its mandate in recent years to include joint security and economic development programs. In 2014, China hosted the bloc’sPeace Mission, its largest military exercise in terms of the number troops involved, more than seven thousand, and advanced weaponry deployed. Other organizational priorities are initiatives to deepen economic and energy cooperation, including establishng a bloc-wide development bank.

The SCO as a group does not have much sway in Afghanistan, though the organization considers religious extremism, terrorism, and drug trafficking in the country as potential serious threats to the region. Its neighbors share the fear that instability in Afghanistan will spread beyond its borders. For  Kabul to participate in SCO counterterrorism initiatives, Afghanistan was elevated from an SCO contact group to full observer status at the 2012 SCO summit in Beijing. With the presence of theTalibanand local militants aligned with the self-proclaimed Islamic State and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and the drawdown of NATO forces, the landlocked country’s security situation remains a top priority at SCO meetings. New Afghan leaders President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah have backed greater SCO participation in rebuilding efforts, but the organization has had little involvement to date.

However, some SCO member nations have intensified bilateral engagement with the country. China, in particular, has sought to play a larger role in stabilizing Afghanistan to protect its substantial investments. Currently, China is the largest SCO investor in Afghanistan, with projects including the $3 billion contract to develop the Aynak copper mine (though its completion has faced numerousdelays). Leaders in Beijing hope that a stable Afghanistan will have a“spillover” effecton China’s own restive autonomous region ofXinjiang. Russia, too, participates in a variety of bilateral efforts with Afghanistan, including the provision of weapons to its army, counternarcotics initiatives, and its owninvestmentprojects. From 1979 to 1989 the Soviet Union and Afghanistan were at war, but today, Russia has a vested interest in the country’s security. Moscow views the SCO’s Central Asian members as a buffer zone between Russia and Afghanistan, says Raffaello Pantucci of the London-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and therefore chooses to strengthen broader regional security to prevent instability in Afghanistan from spreading to Russian borders. Central Asian partners, includingKazakhstanandUzbekistan, have also made significant investments in Afghanistan.

Despite these bilateral initiatives, it is unclear if the SCO will play a larger role in Afghanistan. The organization’s narrow action is in part due to the obstructivism by members who prefer to tackle security issues at the bilateral level, and friction and distrust between members prevent the SCO from forming a unified policy on security issues in Afghanistan. Experts cite the absence of not onlypolitical will, but also a limitedeconomic capacity (PDF)for the bloc to take on a military role. However, Weitz writes that if SCO members could make an effective contribution to Afghan prosperity and security, Western powers may come toappreciatethe Eurasian body.

Economic cooperation has become one of the organization’s more pressing  goals in recent years. At the Ufa summit in Russia, member states adopted the SCO Development Strategy, which included bolstering finance, investment, and trade cooperation as a priority over the next ten years. Beijing has pushed the organization to focus on economic cooperation with proposals like launching a development fund and a free-trade zone. In the past, many of these initiatives were“met with skepticism” (PDF)by regional, according to Pantucci. However, Central Asian member states, in need of infrastructure and energy investment, have been responsive to these overtures, despite Russian sensitivities to China’s expanding influence in former Soviet satellites.

Several SCO member states—notably Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan—possess some of the world’s largest reserves of oil and natural gas, driving interest in expanded energy cooperation among members. At a June 2006 summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for an “energy dialogue, integration of our national energy concepts, and the creation of an Energy Club.” During that meeting, member states discussed establishing a “unified energy market” for oil and gas exports, while also promoting regional development through preferential energy agreements. However, the plans never materialized due todiverging interests (PDF)between energy consumers and energy producers. China is looking to tap energy resources for its growing demand and while Kazkhakstan and Russia are dominant energy exporters, Uzbekistan increasingly needs its energy resources for domestic development and consumption, and the economies in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain weak. Members “prefer to keep national control over their production, supply, and consumption mechanisms and agreements,” according to Julie Boland, a former Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Still, regional energy cooperation occurs outside of SCO auspices. Russia hassecured agreementswith several of its Central Asian neighbors to build gas pipelines. China’s energy diplomacy similarly follows a bilateral course. For example, theCentral Asia–China Gas Pipelineconsists of multiple lines, both completed and still under construction, running more than 1,100 miles through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Beijing alsopledgeda $16.3 billion fund to integrate the region, reviving old trade routes as part of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt. Though China’s flurry of activity has been uprooting Russia’s traditionally dominant influence in the region,energy dealsbetween Beijing and Moscow are also on the rise.

Energy cooperation is but one facet of the economic exchanges among SCO members. China pitched the establishment of an inter-SCO Development Bank in 2010 as a smaller, regional version of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The SCO’s consensus-based decision-making procedures have enabled Moscow to block the emergence of the SCO Development Bank for years, fearing that the institution wouldcede full controlto Beijing as its dominant financier. Though the final document from the 2015 Ufa summit did not address the status of the bank, there are indications that Russia may be more willing to cooperate with China moving forward. RUSI’s Sarah Lain writes that within multilateral bodies, “Russia appears willing to accept someloss of statusin favour of China” in order to gain from closer ties with China.

China and Russia are the twin engines of the SCO, despite offering differing visions for the organization. Decades of rapid economic growth have propelled China onto the world’s stage, whereas Russia has found itself beset with economic turmoil and geopolitical isolation following its 2014 annexation of Crimea, subsequent ejection from the G8, and continuing involvement in the Ukraine conflict. In the past year, the Russian economy has faltered amid currency and oil price volatility, as well as an onslaught of sanctions imposed by the West.

Moscow had longblocked Beijing’s effortsto advance economic initiatives within the SCO. However, much like its Central Asian neighbors, Moscow is now looking to benefit from Chinese investments, including from energy and manufacturing deals. Since the fallout between Russia and the West, Russia has made its own “pivot” to the East to improve ties with its Asian neighbors, opening the door for greater cooperation between Beijing and Moscow in shaping the SCO agenda. Of late, China’s slowing growth has injected a degree of uncertainty about the future momentum of its economy, but analysts say that due to Russia’s own economy volatility, China will remain crucial partner for an increasingly isolated Russia.

Some experts believe that recent moves by Beijing and Moscow, including the agreement toharmonizeChina’s Silk Road Economic Belt and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and bilateral military exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, signal  an entente between the two regional powers. Greg Shtraks, a fellow at the East China Normal University in Shanghai,writes that the improvement in Sino-Russian relations seems to be a “genuine,lasting phenomenon.” Pantucci adds that Moscow’s overtures to Beijing not only indicate a willingness, but also an eagerness to have a close bilateral relationship, in both appearance and practice.

However, others like University of Tasmania’s Matthew Sussex believe that Russia’s relationship with China has “deepened by necessityrather than a sense of mutual trust.” Anita Inder Singh of the New Delhi-based Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution doubts the durability of Beijing and Moscow’s cooperation, claiming that the “‘has-been superpower’ and the ‘wannabe great power’ are engaged in acontest for primacyin Eurasia.”

Enlargement brings both risks and rewards. To date, the SCO has yet to finalize the expansion of its membership, despite applications from India, Iran, and Pakistan. In September 2014, the SCOclearedall legal hurdles to expansion at the heads of state summit, and India and Pakistan began the accession process at the July 2015 summit in Ufa. Belarus, a former dialogue partner, was also upgraded to observer state, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, and Nepal wereintroducedas new dialogue partners.

Beijing maintains that SCO expansion would “infusefresh vigorinto the group’s future development and boost its influence and appeal in the international arena.” Moscow sees the addition of India and Pakistan as a chance toincreaseboth the bloc’s political and economic potential and boost its ability to counter pressing regional challenges. Meanwhile, smaller SCO members, concerned of being squeezed by the interests of two superpowers, see the inclusion of India and Pakistan as an opportunity to diversify and build new partnerships.

Meanwhile, some area experts say that introducing new members—including those with fraught bilateral relations like India and Pakistan—to an organization that has been criticized for inefficacy is unlikely to result in greater efficiencies or cohesion. Barnard College’s Alexander Cooley cautions that expansion will make the SCO, “asymbolic organizationrather than a vehicle for any kind of substantive regional integration or cooperative problem solving.”

Despite the potential drawbacks, some experts say that there are collective gains to be made for the still-young grouping. As the two South Asian nations join, theprospects for a SCO Development Bankmay improve. New Delhi, keen to invest in Central Asia, would be a source of valuable financing and inject life into ambitious infrastructure and energy development plans. The addition of the world’s largest democracy, India, could also grant greater legitimacy to the body traditionally seen as a club of authoritarian governments. CFR’s Elizabeth C. Economy and William Piekos write that “while expansion may hinder the organization’s ability to act decisively, it will give the SCO theopportunity to revolutionize itselfinto a more comprehensive institution capable of connecting and integrating a broad swath of Asia.”

Emanuel Pastreich

Francis Fukuyama is a leading American political scientist, political economist, and author best known for his booksThe End of History and the Last Man(1992) and theOrigins of the Political Order. He serves as a Senior Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University.

We have to start with the simplest of questions. If we want to understand the challenges in East Asia today, we must first consider why it is thatAsia has become so centralin theglobal economy andwhy it plays an increasingly large role inglobal politics. How do you explain the enormous shiftthat we are witnessing today?

Well, there is a significant difference between the economic and the political spheres. Obviously, the biggest shift is to be observed in the economic realm. We can trace it back to the industrialization of China after the Cultural Revolution and rise of the four tigers: South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong. But the shift in terms of political power is a much slower process than the economic shift.

Overall, Asia punches below its weight in terms of its ability to shape the rules for the global system and the direction that global governance is evolving towards. It is an issue of what Joseph Nye refers to as “soft power” – the ability of a nation to project ideas and concepts, build influential institutions and practices. The lag at the level of ideas is even more severe than the lag in terms of political power.

So if we talk about the rise of Asia, we must be sure that we are clear about what aspect of the rise we are referring to. If we ask the specific question, “Why has East Asia’s economic development been so successful?” We can speak with more confidence about a clear rise, although that rise does not necessarily fulfill all the traditional expectation for growing power and influence. We can be sure; however, that China will continue to increase its influence in global affairs for the foreseeable future.

And yet China’s rise is profoundly paradoxical. China is increasing influence in the political and economic spheres today, and is engaged in large-scale aid projects that are unprecedented in its history. At the same time, if you go to Shanghai, you will find more and more Chinese students studying English and trying to go abroad to study at American universities. There is more interest, not less, in moving to advanced countries now than was the case twenty years ago.

The trend is real, but it perhaps has more to do with the fact that there are simply more Chinese who have the money to send their children to the United States for their studies than anything else. Nevertheless, we can see that although China has the economic, the cultural and educational soft power is still lacking.

For all its weaknesses, the United States projects a tremendous amount of soft power globally. China cannot match that power yet.

But what is it exactly that gives the U.S. that advantage? Why has it been so hard for China, Korea and Japan, in spite of astounding economic growth, to have that sort of cultural impact? Certainly the cultures are extremely sophisticated and the level of education is very high.

We are seeing some changes these days, but the building of institutions, the growth of global networks, and the acceptance of new cultures takes generations.

Korea has done well in terms of culture. If you look at the spread of K-pop, Korean soap operas and Korean movies, Korea is producing a highly competitive culture that is expanding rapidly, even including spheres like manga and anime that were once exclusively Japanese. But such cultural influence has very little to do with GDP.

Significant shifts may come, but they will not be fast.

I suppose that the dominance of the English language is also an important factor.

The power of English has a long history, dating back to the British Empire, but its continued dominance is in part a reflection of culture, and in part a reflection of U.S. dominance in international business. In spite of the remaining dominance of English, we can perceive significant shifts. People are starting to learn Mandarin around the world, and that trend will continue. For some in Africa, Chinese seems like a very significant language. Eventually cultural influence will follow from growing economic power, but the lag time is significant.

And we are in an age of unprecedented age of globalization that defies previous precedents. For example, if you read the published statistics concerning members of the Chinese Central Communist Party committee, you will see that an extraordinary number of them have either a relative living abroad or own property abroad. They are committed to a global economy and they have an interest in the economy of the United States. We can see those overseas investments as a way to stash the cash, but there is also a sense in which those overseas investments are a security net of sorts. I do think there’s a sense that Western countries, whatever problems they may have, are fundamentally more stable politically than developing nations.

Therefore, despite all of China’s remarkable success, continued stability and prosperity is not something that they can take for granted? The accumulation of capital is not a replacement for quality of life, for getting a quality education, having safe food to eat. Even the superrich in Beijing can have kids with asthma who become terribly sick because of air pollution.

The author Lee Chang Rae recently published a novel entitled On Such a Full Seadescribing an authoritarian state in a megacity B-Mor (the former Baltimore) which is populated with immigrants from a village in “New China” that become uninhabitable because of climate change. The novel suggests that we may encounter a world quite different than our common “rise and fall of great powers” assumptions and that technology and climate change will be major factors. The entire world is being impacted by China’s rise and Lee Chang Rae’s scenario is not far-fetched.

There is a debate in the West, and to some degree in China, as to whether China is really capable of fundamental innovation. I probably fall into the camp of those who say that you we should not underestimate China’s ability to make profound shifts. China has changed far more than anyone imagined since the Cultural Revolution and it has a long history of institutional transformation. Although much of China’s recent economic and intellectual progress has been a form of catch-up. China is a vast country with many smart people. I would not assume that just because China lacks great political freedom that this means China isn’t going to be able achieve astounding progress, to innovate in technology and institution building.

Certainly China has a long tradition of good government and of institutional innovation. From the Tang and Song Dynasties to the Ming and Qing Dynasties, China has been able to generate internal reform on many occasions. There have been some scholars like Daniel Bell at Tsinghua University, in his bookThe China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy, or Zhang Weiwei of Fudan University in his bookThe China Wave: Rise of a Civilizational State, who argue that China is fundamentally different than other nations in that it is a civilization, not a nation state. Is there perhaps something transformative of China that seeks to remake the entire world, not just expand into new markets?

I’m a little skeptical of such efforts to see some sort of new Confucian vision in the chaos that is the present Chinese political economy. I just do not see an integrated package; it’s an incoherent package. The official message coming out of China in its official sources is still taking Marxism-Leninism as its base. Perhaps there is a sincerely interest in the past, but basically Chinese are pretty confused about Confucianism. Although it may feel good to think on is building on a great tradition of millennia. But when push comes to shove they are back to Marxism or neo-liberalism. They end up filling the ideological vacuum with consumerism and greed. As long as the economic growth keeps up, they will be alright. But I do not see too much Confucian civilization in the hard choices that Chinese politicians make.

But in the West things are at last shifting a bit. Western intellectual are taking a stronger interest in Asia and reading and writing about China and its culture and politics. How broad is the interest in East Asia in Washington D.C.?

Although interest in Asia has risen remarkably, it is probably still far from what it should be. The rise of China has triggered broad introspection about Western and American institutions and their shortcomings. There have been some debates in the fringes, but the serious reorientation has not started. Most people in the West acknowledge there is a new drive in China and they express concern about job losses in the United States. But there are few who look at the rise of China and East Asia as a challenge to the dominance of Western civilization.

What do you think is the primary challenge to the U.S. and Europe today?

Many social scientists in the United States have postulated that economic freedom without a corresponding degree of political freedom is not sustainable. They assume that China will have to open up its political system and to democratize in one way or another. But there are serious problems with this assumption. If we think long term, say thirty years in the future, could we have a China in which economic growth is significantly higher than that in the West, a Chinese economy that has completely displaced the U.S. in scale and impact, but still have a China in which the government calls the shots domestically and internationally? Such a scenario is entirely possible and could create immense challenges to current global institutions. Few in the West want to imagine such an outcome. But that is not an excuse for presenting wishful thinking as critical analysis.

At the same time, the question of freedom is a complex one. Certain areas of Shanghai, for example, have access to Face book and Google and there are virtually no cases of interference from the government – if you are part of the “international community.” Many American expats feel oddly freer in that Chinese environment.

Yes, there are clearly pockets in China that are quite open these days. Globalization produces all sorts of complexities.

And what about Europe? How has the rise of Asia impacted France, Germany, Italy and other European powers?

What is striking about Europe is just how little attention they pay to China. Although I wish the United States took Asia seriously, compared with Europe, we are doing a pretty good job. You would be amazed to see how much Europeans still are talking about the challenge from America and the American model for business. They are having trouble getting their heads around the fact that China going to be a major player in the world and that what happens in the Chinese economy impacts the European economy. Similarly, the study of China, Japan and Korea in Europe is far behind the United States. There are not that many Chinese speakers and almost no one who can deliver a speech or read a book in an Asian language.

We have stressed China so far in our conversation, but in reality Korea and Japan remain quite significant. Might there be a risk that America focuses too much on the China challenge and loses track of the important developments in the rest of Asia. After all, Korea and Japan are major players in Southeast Asia and Africa, often displaying a greater sophistication than China.

Asia is polycentric, multi-polar, and constantly evolving. There is no uniformity in Asia in terms of geopolitics and culture and each of those countries is a separate world to itself, even as it overlaps in trade and commerce with its neighbors and with the United States. It is a challenge for Americans to keep up with that region.

The conditions are really different in each country. If we take a slightly longer-term horizon, all of Asia will be caught in this demographic trap (declining and aging population) which may have unintended consequences. Japan was the first to experience that shift, and we have seen articles about aging villages in the Western media for some time. But the trend for the future is actually more severe in Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. These countries are struggling to come up with some solution to the aging population crisis, and the resulting growth of a multi-cultural society.

But if you looked at middle-class and upper-middle class Caucasians in Europe or the United States, is not that population is more or less following the same trajectory as the aging populations of Korea or Japan. 

One cannot make sweeping statements. The fertility rates for Caucasians in the United States remain higher than that of countries like Korea and Japan. In the case of Scandinavia fertility rates have risen above the replacement rate. I speculate that countries that have the lowest fertility rates in the world are those in which you have a high level of female education, but still socially conservative mores that limit career opportunities for women. That is exactly what we find in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, where a lot of women don’t want to enter into marriages that require them to stay home and raise families, but the childcare facilities necessary for them to pursue careers do not exist. In Japan, the average age for the marriage of women keeps rising every year.

It’s amazing that although many families in Korea or Japan place so much emphasis on education for both boys and girls, there is an absolute distinction after graduation from college. Equality of opportunity suddenly ends when the student receives a diploma.

I met a professor at Julliard who was just livid because although many of his best piano students are Korean women, not a single one of them has turned that talent into a career as a musician. Despite all their talents, they dutifully go back to Korea and marry a rich corporate executive. Their outstanding musical talent becomes, he lamented, but an adornment, a hobby. There was no opportunity for those women to pursue a career in music.

Let’s talk about the current tensions in Asia, specifically those between China, Japan, and Korea. Although some make grim analogies between Asia today and Europe just before World War I, it seems to me that the conflicts over islands are fundamentally different in its nature from the battle over territory occupied by large populations.

I think the conflicts are quite serious because they are powered by the rise of nationalism in Korea, Japan, and China. Young people in each of these countries are growing more nationalistic than was their parents’ generation, and that trend is quite dangerous. Honestly, I am quite worried by what I see happening today. The territorial disputes are not inherently critical, but they take on tremendous symbolic significance and they are at the center of a struggle over geopolitical power. The fight over the future of the Senkaku Islands is not just about a few uninhabited rocks. It is a contest over who will set the rules in Asia, China or Japan. It is this larger question that absorbs the interests of both countries.

It’s still a different situation from, say, Alsace-Lorraine; no one lives there after all.

Sure, no one wants to start a war over a stupid bunch of rocks. But history shows that strange things like that can happen.

What are your thoughts about the U.S. and its position in East Asia? What do you think is the appropriate role for the U.S. to play in Asia going forward?

I think the U.S. needs to adjust to growing Chinese power but needs to be mindful of existing commitments. The accommodation of Chinese power cannot come at the expense of traditional allies – Japan, Korea, etc. Doing that is going to be very difficult. In the case of Japan, the Japanese have actually provoked a lot of the problems that they’re in right now, by the kind of nationalistic planes of revisionism that is going on there.

I am concerned by nationalist activities throughout East Asia. But as someone who taught Japanese studies for many years, I am disturbed especially by the purging of information about the Second World War from school history books and the shutting down of museums that provide an accurate narrative of what Japan did during the war. Japan is a sophisticated nation with a highly educated population. Such steps are just wrong.

There are definitely a lot of disturbing trends in Japan. The majority of the Japanese people do not support these actions, but there is a significant nationalistic right that has not accepted the outcome of the Second World War in the way that the Germans have.

You have grown up in the United States, but your family is from Japan. Does that impact your perspective?

My perspective on East Asia is completely American. I have no sympathy for the Japanese nationalists. The United States has an alliance commitment to Japan, but the position Japan has taken on many disputes with its neighbors has been self-defeating.

Coming back the U.S. role in East Asia, you suggest that the United States must engage China, and recognize its new status, but that there may also be some legitimate reasons for the United States to remain wary of China’s intentions. What specifically must the United States do to create stable security architecture in East Asia?

I feel that the U.S. needs to promote multilateralism in Asia and to consider multilateralism to be in its own long-term interests. The United States has certain advantages in its bilateral alliances. But the use of bilateral relations in Asia can also undermine American influence.

For example, China would like to deal with all ASEAN countries individually, through bilateral exchanges. But can we solve the complex multilateral disputes over coral reefs in the Pacific by a series of bilateral discussions? I think we need to do so through ASEAN, other international bodies, or new institutions that we will build.

I made a proposal inForeign Affairs about a decade ago for a multilateral structure related to diplomacy and security in which all countries, including China, can talk openly about defense budgets, confidence-building measures, and other topics and come to meaningful resolutions.

I have noticed thatKoreans, whether politically conservative or liberal, are committed to a multilateral vision of the future. Unlike the United States or Japan, there is no conservative faction that wants to dismantle multilateralism and pursue national military power without regard for international opinion. Perhaps this is a result of Korea’s position in multiple trade agreements that make its economy inherently multilateral.

I have noticed a strong interest in multilateral institutions in Korea. Such arrangements serve as a force-multiplier.

Let me close with a question about technology. How do you think evolving technologies (drones, cyberspace and other technologies with dual uses) are changing the nature of conflict and international relations, and what are the implications of those changes for East Asia?

I think you can see profound changes already in cyberspace. Already there are essentially no rules whatsoever. For example, if you hack into another country’s computer system, whether the computer belongs to a corporation or to the military, does that constitute an act of war? Who counts as a representative of the government of a country in cyberspace?

We have no agreement about the remedy to growing cybercrime. In fact we do not even agree on what kinds of responses are acceptable. Even if you do know who committed the crime, experts do not agree on how serious it is. And numerous reports of hacking have tended to make the public somewhat skeptical.

I suspect that rules and regulations about online crimes are going to be harder to enforce simply because the technology is so rapidly changing and often it is hard to show there has even been a crime.

Emanuel Pastreich is Director of the Asia Institute. Theoriginal versionof this article is available at Asia Today. This is the first of an interview series organized by theAsia Institute. 

Courtesy: The Diplomat