Oman is the nearest Arab country to Pakistan, because of this, they both share a maritime boundary with each other. Pakistan and Oman cooperate in diverse sectors to enhance the bilateral economic, military and trade relations. Pakistan and Oman share common interests in ensuring maritime security and free flow of commerce through the region. Accordingly, navies of the two countries have been cooperating on a wide range of issues in maritime domain. Both navies have been regularly participating in Maritime Security Operations at sea. In the area of human resource, PN is providing officers and men on deputation to Omani Navy to support RNO in fulfilling its maritime and naval obligations. The two navies have also been closely collaborating in the field of training of respective officers and men.

This year The Pakistan Navy and Royal Navy of Oman (RNO) participated in the naval exercise ‘Thamar Al Tayyib 2021’ (TAT-21) in the North Arabian Sea. The exercise conducted in Pakistani territorial waters from December 13-18 included the participation of surface and air units, besides special operations forces from both navies. The Omani Navy Task Group comprised RNO ships Al Dhaferah and Al Seeb. Maritime patrol aircraft of Royal Air Force of Oman also participated in the exercise. The sea phase of the exercise comprised counter-terrorism, anti-air and anti-surface warfare operations with an overall aim to curb illicit activities at sea. Exercises between the two navies have regularly been conducted since 1990. The last exercise in the TAT series was conducted in Oman waters in 2019. During the harbour phase of the exercise, operational and tactical-level discussions and pre-exercise conferences were conducted. The sea phase of the exercise included counter-terrorism training, anti-air and anti-surface warfare operations with a focus on curbing illicit activities at sea, according to the official statement. Gwadar Port and Salalah Port can be used to create efficient communication channels between the two countries because both ports possess excellent infrastructure and other facilities.  Regular conduct of bilateral naval exercise between the Pakistan Navy and the Royal Navy of Oman are indicative of long-standing brotherly relations between the two countries in general and both navies in particular.

Content Awaiting

Security of any State lies in its planning; where a state try to prevent an aggressor form its territorial integrity. Some states specify their national security goals which are not compromised in any case. Even the matters relating to the national security kept secret, even state do not allow media to highlight such issues. For example, for Pakistan the state sovereignty in a matter of national security which cannot be hurt in any case? Sometimes state is not aware of its national security goals due to its immense involvement in other cases. In that case Pakistan House is there to held such seminars which will aware to state that, this particular mater is related to national security and must be pursued on the preference basis.

Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls

International Crises Group                                                                             Islamabad/Brussels, 22 July 2015

The 16 December 2014 attack on an army-run school in Peshawar, which killed 150, mainly children, claimed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan-TTP), was ostensibly a game changer. A week later, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) government unveiled a new counter-terrorism strategy, the twenty-point National Action Plan (NAP), with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif vowing to target all terror groups without distinction. Six months later, amid continued terror attacks, the NAP looks far more like a hastily-conceived wish-list devised for public consumption during a moment of crisis than a coherent strategy. Reliance on blunt instruments and lethal force to counter terrorism risks doing more harm than good when they undermine constitutionalism, democratic governance and the rule of law and provide grist to the jihadist’ propaganda mill. A reformed and strengthened criminal justice system is pivotal to countering terror threats and containing violent extremism.

The militarization of counter-terrorism policy puts at risk Pakistan’s evolution toward greater civilian rule, which is itself a necessary but not sufficient condition to stabilize the democratic transition. While the report addresses the coercive side of a counter-terrorism policy and how to make it more efficient, without structural and governance reform, the root causes of terrorism and extremism will remain unaddressed, and violent jihadist will continue to exploit the absence of rule of law. The military’s continual undermining of civilian authority since democracy’s restoration in 2008 will remain a major challenge to meaningful and sustained reform. Yet, the political leadership also bears responsibility for failing to push back and, as a result, undermining its credibility and authority.

After inaugurating the NAP on 24 December, the Sharif government implemented two major demands of the military without delay: lifting the predecessor government’s 2008 moratorium on the death penalty; and passing on 6 January 2015 the 21st constitutional amendment, empowering special military courts to try all terrorism suspects, including civilians. Yet, the vast majority of the 176 executions since late December have been for crimes unrelated to terrorism, and the military courts weaken constitutional protections and due process. Other newly-created parallel structures, including provincial “apex committees”, enable the military to bypass representative institutions and play a more direct role in governance. Armed with new legal tools, the military has further marginalized civilian institutions in devising and implementing counter-terrorism policy.

Unsurprisingly, there is little evidence of progress on many NAP targets. Groups and individuals banned in Pakistan and also blacklisted under UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1267, continue to operate freely. Efforts to regulate the madrasa sector curb hate speech and literature and block terrorist financing have been haphazard at best.

A reformed and strengthened criminal justice system could have helped to achieve NAP’s objectives. The Sharif government still has an opportunity, albeit fast shrinking, to reverse course and meaningfully overhaul counter-terrorism strategy, but this necessitates revoking major policy concessions to the military. The government should take on that challenge in order to replace an overly militarized response with a revamped, intelligence-guided counter-terrorism strategy, led by civilian law enforcement agencies, particularly the police. Dismantling terror networks, detaining and trying jihadist leaders and foot soldiers, disrupting terror financing and ending radicalization through hate speech and literature will require reallocating limited resources in order to strengthen the capacity of the provincial police forces. While the three basic bodies of law, the Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Evidence Act, need to be modernized, it is even more urgent to build police capacity to enforce them. That capacity has been gravely eroded due to the inadequacy of resources, training, internal accountability and autonomy.

An empowered, resourced police force remains the most credible tool for enforcing a sustained and successful counter-terrorism strategy. The current emphasis on revenge and retribution and the emasculation of fundamental rights and rule of law are undermining citizen confidence in the state to deliver justice, a flawed approach that also fuels grievances that benefit the violent extremists the NAP is aimed at combating.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To develop a civilian-led and intelligence-based counter-terrorism strategy

To the federal and provincial governments:

1.  Make the expansion, modernization and effectiveness of local and provincial police forces’ investigation branches a top counter-terrorism priority, including through training and technology in crime-scene investigation and case building.

2.  Disband the new parallel counter-terrorism forces and absorb their personnel and functions into regular police cadres after requisite training.

3.  Reform the Evidence Act to shift focus from witness testimony to modern scientific evidence; and invest in strong state-protection programs for witnesses, investigators, prosecutors and judges in terrorism and other major criminal cases.

4.  Enhance police operational autonomy and accountability, including by ensuring that the provincial police inspector general (IG) is appointed on merit and granted full authority over the force.

To the provincial police leadership:

5.  Undertake a comprehensive examination of their force to determine staffing and training needs, with particular emphasis on developing effective investigation cadres; and establish career progression paths that depend on performance.

6.  Review comprehensively and reform the training curriculum, in consultation with in-house and external experts, so as to create learning modules for intelligence-led counter-terrorism operations that include an emphasis on the police role in curbing hate speech and literature and enforcing the law against clerics, mosques and madrasas advocating or supporting violence.

For robust monitoring of banned groups and individuals

To the federal and provincial governments:

7.  Reconcile Pakistan’s list of banned groups under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) 1997 with the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1267 committee blacklist; and make both lists available to the federal and provincial police, other law enforcement agencies, financial institutions and the public.

8.  Develop a regularly-updated list of officers and members of banned groups, and enforce requisite curbs on travel, bearing arms, financial transactions and other proscribed activities.

9.  Update periodically the ATA’s Fourth Schedule, listing known suspects belonging to banned organizations, and requires police stations and district police superintendents to account regularly for the individuals on the Fourth Schedule in their jurisdictions.

10.  Ensure that the police investigate and monitor all madrasas, mosques and charities with known or suspected links to banned groups under the ATA or the UNSC 1267 blacklist, as well as those that maintain armed militias, or whose administrators and/or members propagate hate and/or incite violence and other criminal acts within or from the country.

To curb terrorist financing and money laundering

To the federal and provincial governments:

11.  Develop a specialized cell within the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to investigate terror financing and money laundering; and establish concurrent jurisdiction over such cases between the FIA and specialized provincial police units and counter-terrorism departments.

12.  Make anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing methods an integral part of the police training curriculum, based on international standards.

13.  Require banks and other financial institutions to install, with international assistance, software for crosschecking names of existing and potential clients against those sanctioned under the ATA; and ensure provincial police are given this information and information gained from comprehensive audits of madrasas, mosques and charities with known or suspected affiliations to violent jihadist.

14.  Enhance the state’s ability to curb terror financing within and from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) by extending the jurisdiction of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province police, FIA and other relevant civilian law enforcement agencies to the tribal belt.

To achieve a sustainable counter-insurgency strategy in FATA

To the federal government and parliament:

15.  Pass Senator Farhatullah Babar’s constitutional amendment bill extending the jurisdiction of the superior judiciary to FATA; and follow up with another constitutional amendment that repeals Article 247, ends FATA’s separate legal status and extends the jurisdiction of the police and other civilian law-enforcement agencies to FATA.

16.  Abolish the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), replacing it with the Pakistan Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code.

The News, February 23, 2012

National security vs welfare

Iqbal Haider

Should the priority and focus of the state be national security or the security and welfare of the people who live in it? This is an issue, which is being debated particularly in Pakistan and in other South Asian countries.
I belong to the school of thought which believes that social welfare should not be compromised by national security considerations. No doubt, territorial integrity and stability within the states and from inter-state conflicts must be secured, but the paramount consideration ought to be welfare of the people. If social welfare is not secured then the people tend to secure their economic interests in other countries.
Regrettably, in India and Pakistan our budget allocation priorities have remained riveted on the defence sector. If we cannot afford to make such huge allocations for the defence, we readily indulge in borrowings in billions of dollars, which makes our future generations also heavily indebted. This obviously results in neglect of the social sector. These arguments constitute simple common sense but unfortunately certain vested interests and the establishments of our countries, which thrive on promotion of hatred and conflicts, reject such simple logic and reasoning.
The prudent and advisable policies to secure both national security and social welfare of the people, is to establish warm, cordial relations and cooperation in all spheres with our neighbouring countries, rather than placing reliance on distantly located the US or the western block. China, in my opinion, appears to be a more trustworthy neighbour to secure not only defence but also equitable economic developments.
Last year in July a conference was held in China to discuss ways and means to promote collaboration between China and Saarc through Enhanced People to People Exchanges. It is obvious from the very decision to hold this Conference in China that both the government its think tanks are equally desirous of promoting more close and cordial relations with the Saarc countries. Greater cooperation and closer ties of the Saarc countries with China, in my opinion, would not only serve our national security concerns but also enable us to give greater priority and allocation to the social sector, which is the critical need of the oppressed people of the entire South Asia region.
It is very heartening to note that in the post-Cold War era, both the Congress Party and the BJP of India have wisely pursued a consistent policy of reconciliation and engagement with China. The past prime ministers of these parties and other leaders of India have repeatedly expressed that “India had no wish to hold China as an enemy or a threat.” They reinforced the desire to establish friendly relations with China.
At no point has the diplomatic engagement between India and China ceased. Even the 1998 nuclear tests by India did not cause any harm to India’s policy and relations with China. To my knowledge, India has also succeeded in making some territorial adjustments with China. Lately, the economic ties between India and China have attained new heights, perhaps China is the biggest trading partner of India.
On the other hand, China is the most trusted ally and strategic partner of Pakistan for close to five decades. China, being the common denominator between India and Pakistan, is well placed to play a significant role in promoting cordial relations, peace and progress not only between our three countries but also in the entire South Asian region. China’s high profile in economic interactions at both bilateral and regional levels has most favourable implications for the region as a whole.
It is necessary to highlight a most potent threat to our security: the curse of terrorism. It is not only destroying peace and security of both India and Pakistan, but also harming trust and confidence between the two. The incidents of terrorism are creating very serious impediments in the badly needed peace process between India and Pakistan. I want the people of India to realize that the “jihadis” and their terrorist activities are our common enemies.
It is imperative for Pakistan and India, being next-door neighbours, to devise a joint strategy with sincerity of purpose for combating terrorism in our region. Terrorism is not only a threat to our national security but also to the life and property of our people from within our respective countries. Those terrorists, who were involved in one of the worst tragedies of 26/11 in Mumbai, or in the terrorist attack on the Houses of Parliament in Delhi on Dec 13, 2001, or in the commission of the same barbaric acts of terrorism every other week in all nooks and corners of Pakistan, are enemies of Pakistan, and equally of India. Pakistan, in particular, is the worst victim of religious extremist terrorist organisations.
According to unofficial sources since 2002 more than 7,000 members of our military and paramilitary forces, including one lieutenant general, one major general, five brigadiers, and police have sacrificed their precious lives in confronting these terrorists. More than 70,000 innocent citizens in various part of our country have died in innumerable attacks by the terrorists during the same period. Terrorists are our number-one enemy. The two governments must clear the perception or allegations about any state actor or non-state actors in our respective countries involved in such unforgivable acts of terrorism.
The imperatives of the foreign policy of both India and Pakistan must be focused on the principles of peaceful coexistence and economic collaboration and to put an end to the blame-game strategy and the hate propaganda by state or non state elements.
The Kashmir dispute should not be allowed to prevent forever the existence of cordial relations between our two countries. One of the viable, realistic and pragmatic solutions for resolving the Kashmir dispute, at least for the time being and without prejudice to the respective stands of the two countries on Kashmir, is to accept the Line of Control with some adjustment as the international border.
In my view, this is also the spirit and objective of the Shimla Agreement of 1972. This must, however, be followed by a treaty between India and Pakistan containing firm and sincere commitments: (a) that both countries must discourage and prevent aggressive actions, militancy or terrorism or policy of blame-games against each other; and (b) the border between the two countries and between the two Kashmirs should be opened to the people at large with free access, free trade, exchange of cultural activities, academics, intellectual groups, sports events, free access to the electronic and print media, etc.
We can draw incalculable dividends by establishment of peace, harmony, open borders, an environment of trust, cooperation and collaboration between the Saarc countries, and with China. This will usher in a new era of prosperity and peace. It will also provide free access between the Saarc countries and the Central Asian countries as well to serve our basic needs and interests.

The writer is a senior advocate of the Supreme Court and former senator and federal minister. Email: ihaider45@yahoo.com

Shamshad Ahmad

Given our colossal economic mess-up under the present government, we always thought there is no real economist available to it. But we have now discovered it does have one. He happens to be the head of the now almost defunct Planning Commission. The story goes that last week this distinguished economist, who had never been heard of ever since this government came to office, was to present the blueprint of a plan for Pakistan’s economic recovery and development.

The story further goes that the venue of his presentation was to be the prime military institution, the National Defence University (NDU), regarding the contents of the notorious May 10 memo. Ironically, this was also the place where our civil and military leadership had assembled 13 years ago to take the decision to go ahead with our nuclear tests on May 28, 1998.

Symbolically, therefore, it would have been a blow delivered to the nation by this government through an inconsequential functionary. Timely detection of the radioactivity from the ill-designed “testing device” even before its explosion seems to have pre-empted an embarrassing event. The economist was told not to come to the NDU. The testing device he was to explode was certainly not compatible with the location, a university. No wonder, the planned presentation was aborted.

This brings us to the issue of the memo in which its authors solicited Washington’s behind-the-scenes intervention to put the Pakistani army on the spot. Those who have no competence and credibility of their own – and as per their own admittance in the memo, are devoid of any strategic vision or calibre to be able to assert any civilian control over the military – had been seeking US involvement in Pakistan’s internal affairs from the very beginning. This had beenevidenced in the intrusive conditionalities incorporated at their behest in the Kerry-Lugar Bill three years ago.

The disgraceful memo now crosses all limits by virtually inviting a foreign power to come and take over the country’s control, including its national security apparatus. It envisaged Washington’s intervention with political-military backing, involving not only a revamp of the civilian government but also a wholesale replacement of the national security adviser and other national security officials. The replacements would have been “trusted advisers favourably viewed by Washington, each of whom has long and historical ties to the US military, political and intelligence communities.”

Point four of the memo pledged: “The new national security team is prepared, with full backing of the Pakistani government – initially civilian but eventually all three power centres – to develop an acceptable framework of discipline for the nuclear programme. This effort was begun under the previous military regime, with acceptable results. We are prepared to reactivate those ideas and build on them in a way that brings Pakistan’s nuclear assets under a more verifiable, transparent regime.”

This commitment, if translated into reality, would have inevitably led to the gradual dismantling of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, a process that Gen Musharraf had already begun to secure his presidency for life, and which the authors of the memo, with similar ambitions of lifelong rule, now apparently wanted to carry forward to its logical conclusion. No wonder the treasonous memo case is now under judicial probe at the highest level. A commission has been constituted to investigate the reality behind Memogate.

If proved genuine, as it appears to be from its published transcript and related forensic details, this would perhaps be the most sophisticated version of a Byzantine intrigue in which the state itself is seen to be conspiring against its own sovereignty, and against national security and national honour. The purported six undertakings in the transcript in question simply amount to nothing but ransoming of the state of Pakistan and its independence to a foreign power.

But this is not the first conspiracy of its kind in our land. We have seen umpteen of them before. Thanks to Wikileaks, in recent years, conspiracies of all sorts against the state and its people by our self-serving corrupt rulers with foreign collusion are no longer secret. The most notorious was the NRO deal brokered by the US at the request of a military dictator for a manipulated power-sharing arrangement that would have allowed him to continue in power in a regime with a pleasant civilian face, in the iconic person of Benazir Bhutto, who would have been his prime minister.

A first-hand account of the making of the shady NRO deal is revealed in detail by former US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice in her book No Higher Honor. What is clear from this historical account is that the US secretary of state did everything to pull it off, because that was in her country’s interest. Lamentably, on our side, each player in the game did what was only in his or her personal interest. This has been the tradition of the US-Pakistan relationship. Benazir Bhutto’s tragic death changed the very scene, bringing to power in Pakistan an accidental NRO beneficiary leadership. It was nothing but a political scandal with far-reaching legal implications for Pakistan. Ironically, the Supreme Court’s Dec 16, 2009, verdict on the NRO’s illegality remains unimplemented even though the apex court reaffirmed its ruling in the government’s review petition.

This brings us back to our economist who believes our nuclear programme is obstructing his socio-economic development plans. Unfortunately, the same voices of doom and gloom which opposed Pakistan’s nuclear tests 13 years ago are again questioning the very raison d’etre of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. They have also been seeking to detract from Pakistan’s credible minimum deterrent requirement and trying to suggest that Pakistan is paying a heavy price for its nuclear capability. There couldn’t be a greater insinuation. Given the magnitude of our threat perception, we just cannot afford to lower our guard. We must preserve, protect and consolidate our credible minimum deterrent capability.

Instead of seeking to undermine the country’s national security, our economist friends should have been using their professional skills to control governmental spendings, rooting out corruption from all segments of our society, promoting self-reliance, simplicity and austerity in all spheres of life, and eliminating the VIP culture, including the lavish perks and privileges extended at government expense to holders of public office. What is needed is tightening of belts at the top levels, reducing governmental borrowings, controlling inflation, rationalising of GDP targets, restoring macro-economic balance, and banning non-essential imports and luxuries to reduce the trade gap.

Sustainable economic growth is always predicated on sound macro-economic policies, optimum utilisation of country’s natural and human resources and full exploitation of its agricultural, industrial and technological potential. None of these policies is visible in the present economic governance. Instead of using our nuclear programme as an easy scapegoat for their own failures, our economists should have been exploring judicious planning, effective strategies and homegrown, not foreign-dictated, solutions to our economic problems.

In the ultimate analysis, one thing is clear. All these skeptical assumptions and apprehensions over the necessity of our nuclear programme are totally misplaced, if not mala fide and baseless. Our economic problems are not because of our nuclear programme. Our economic problems are because of flagrant governance failures, endemic crime and corruption, absence of rule of law and justice, poor economic planning, flawed fiscal management, inconsistent macro-economic policies and lack of public safety and peaceful environment.

The writer is a former foreign secretary. Email: shamshad1941@ yahoo.com

The Express Tribune, May 27, 2012

Nuclear weapons and national security

Nuclea­r weapon­s combin­ed with elemen­ts of nation­al power are an instru­ment of policy to safegu­ard nation­al securi­ty.

By Adil Sultan

The writer is a PhD scholar at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad and a former Visiting Fellow at Henry L. Stimson Center Washington DC

In January 1972, at a meeting in Multan, then President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made the momentous decision to develop nuclear weapons that could ensure Pakistan’s territorial integrity and provide security against existential threats that emanated mainly from India. On the 14th anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear tests, it may be useful to analyse the role of nuclear weapons in national security and how safe these weapons are from external threats.

The term ‘national security’ is a broad concept and its remit goes beyond military power. Other elements of national power, including geography, geostrategic environment, economy, diplomacy, demography, and most importantly, the leadership play equally important roles in strengthening national security interests. No single element of national power can alone guarantee safeguarding of national interests.

Nuclear weapons are a vital part of Pakistan’s military strategy. They have not only helped neutralise the military disadvantage as a result of the increasing conventional disparity vis-à-vis India, but have also prevented several wars in the region. In the first 25 years of its existence, Pakistan fought three full-scale wars with India, which eventually led to its dismemberment in 1971. In the following 40 years since work on the nuclear weapons programme started and subsequently when Pakistan acquired nuclear capability, there have been no wars between the two neighbours, except for the 1999 Kargil crisis that does not fall under the category of a conventional war.

Due to the existence of an effective nuclear deterrence, India, despite having a qualitative and quantitative edge in conventional military hardware, was restrained from waging wars in 1985-86 (Brasstacks), 1990 (Kashmir uprising), 1999 (Kargil conflict), 2001-02 (military stand-off), and 2008 (Mumbai attacks). From the economic perspective as well, the cost of three wars far outweighs the money spent on developing and maintaining nuclear weapons capability.

Contrary to the ‘engineered misperceptions’, the acquisition of nuclear deterrence have in fact reduced the imperative for maintaining conventional military parity vis-à-vis India, thus significantly lowering defence expenditures.

Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence was conceived with a focus on deterring future wars with India. It does not take into account the multitude of internal and external threats being faced by it today. In order to transform its threat perception from being mainly India-specific, Pakistan needs to redefine its national objectives that must be consistent with its national power potential. Nevertheless, existence of nuclear capability does provide inherent strength and guarantee that the country cannot be treated like states, which do not have the military means to defend themselves.

The safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons has been a focus of international attention especially after 9/11. Several Western scholars continue to churn out scenarios depicting Pakistan as a fragile state, incapable of handling its nuclear assets.

While these concerns are mainly politically motivated, nevertheless, Pakistan has put in place an effective command and control system. Over 20,000 people are guarding Pakistan’s nuclear assets to ensure that they do not fall into the wrong hands. Likewise, the system also caters for all possible external threats to obviate the likelihood of damage or sabotage.

The history of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is a story of national resilience and tremendous sacrifices. Safeguarding it against external threats — both intellectual and physical — is a national responsibility.

Nuclear weapons combined with other elements of national power are an instrument of policy to safeguard national security interests. Possession of nuclear weapons offers significant edge in terms of enhanced political stature and diplomatic relations. It is up to the state and the leadership to formulate a strategy to exploit this potential.

Published in The Express Tribune, May 28th, 2012.

The Express Tribune, May 27, 2012

Nuclear weapons and national security

Nuclea­r weapon­s combin­ed with elemen­ts of nation­al power are an instru­ment of policy to safegu­ard nation­al securi­ty.

By Adil Sultan

The writer is a PhD scholar at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad and a former Visiting Fellow at Henry L. Stimson Center Washington DC

In January 1972, at a meeting in Multan, then President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made the momentous decision to develop nuclear weapons that could ensure Pakistan’s territorial integrity and provide security against existential threats that emanated mainly from India. On the 14th anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear tests, it may be useful to analyse the role of nuclear weapons in national security and how safe these weapons are from external threats.

The term ‘national security’ is a broad concept and its remit goes beyond military power. Other elements of national power, including geography, geostrategic environment, economy, diplomacy, demography, and most importantly, the leadership play equally important roles in strengthening national security interests. No single element of national power can alone guarantee safeguarding of national interests.

Nuclear weapons are a vital part of Pakistan’s military strategy. They have not only helped neutralise the military disadvantage as a result of the increasing conventional disparity vis-à-vis India, but have also prevented several wars in the region. In the first 25 years of its existence, Pakistan fought three full-scale wars with India, which eventually led to its dismemberment in 1971. In the following 40 years since work on the nuclear weapons programme started and subsequently when Pakistan acquired nuclear capability, there have been no wars between the two neighbours, except for the 1999 Kargil crisis that does not fall under the category of a conventional war.

Due to the existence of an effective nuclear deterrence, India, despite having a qualitative and quantitative edge in conventional military hardware, was restrained from waging wars in 1985-86 (Brasstacks), 1990 (Kashmir uprising), 1999 (Kargil conflict), 2001-02 (military stand-off), and 2008 (Mumbai attacks). From the economic perspective as well, the cost of three wars far outweighs the money spent on developing and maintaining nuclear weapons capability.

Contrary to the ‘engineered misperceptions’, the acquisition of nuclear deterrence have in fact reduced the imperative for maintaining conventional military parity vis-à-vis India, thus significantly lowering defence expenditures.

Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence was conceived with a focus on deterring future wars with India. It does not take into account the multitude of internal and external threats being faced by it today. In order to transform its threat perception from being mainly India-specific, Pakistan needs to redefine its national objectives that must be consistent with its national power potential. Nevertheless, existence of nuclear capability does provide inherent strength and guarantee that the country cannot be treated like states, which do not have the military means to defend themselves.

The safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons has been a focus of international attention especially after 9/11. Several Western scholars continue to churn out scenarios depicting Pakistan as a fragile state, incapable of handling its nuclear assets.

While these concerns are mainly politically motivated, nevertheless, Pakistan has put in place an effective command and control system. Over 20,000 people are guarding Pakistan’s nuclear assets to ensure that they do not fall into the wrong hands. Likewise, the system also caters for all possible external threats to obviate the likelihood of damage or sabotage.

The history of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is a story of national resilience and tremendous sacrifices. Safeguarding it against external threats — both intellectual and physical — is a national responsibility.

Nuclear weapons combined with other elements of national power are an instrument of policy to safeguard national security interests. Possession of nuclear weapons offers significant edge in terms of enhanced political stature and diplomatic relations. It is up to the state and the leadership to formulate a strategy to exploit this potential.

Published in The Express Tribune, May 28th, 2012.

The Express Tribune, May 27, 2012

Nuclear weapons and national security

Nuclea­r weapon­s combin­ed with elemen­ts of nation­al power are an instru­ment of policy to safegu­ard nation­al securi­ty.

By Adil Sultan

The writer is a PhD scholar at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad and a former Visiting Fellow at Henry L. Stimson Center Washington DC

In January 1972, at a meeting in Multan, then President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made the momentous decision to develop nuclear weapons that could ensure Pakistan’s territorial integrity and provide security against existential threats that emanated mainly from India. On the 14th anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear tests, it may be useful to analyse the role of nuclear weapons in national security and how safe these weapons are from external threats.

The term ‘national security’ is a broad concept and its remit goes beyond military power. Other elements of national power, including geography, geostrategic environment, economy, diplomacy, demography, and most importantly, the leadership play equally important roles in strengthening national security interests. No single element of national power can alone guarantee safeguarding of national interests.

Nuclear weapons are a vital part of Pakistan’s military strategy. They have not only helped neutralise the military disadvantage as a result of the increasing conventional disparity vis-à-vis India, but have also prevented several wars in the region. In the first 25 years of its existence, Pakistan fought three full-scale wars with India, which eventually led to its dismemberment in 1971. In the following 40 years since work on the nuclear weapons programme started and subsequently when Pakistan acquired nuclear capability, there have been no wars between the two neighbours, except for the 1999 Kargil crisis that does not fall under the category of a conventional war.

Due to the existence of an effective nuclear deterrence, India, despite having a qualitative and quantitative edge in conventional military hardware, was restrained from waging wars in 1985-86 (Brasstacks), 1990 (Kashmir uprising), 1999 (Kargil conflict), 2001-02 (military stand-off), and 2008 (Mumbai attacks). From the economic perspective as well, the cost of three wars far outweighs the money spent on developing and maintaining nuclear weapons capability.

Contrary to the ‘engineered misperceptions’, the acquisition of nuclear deterrence have in fact reduced the imperative for maintaining conventional military parity vis-à-vis India, thus significantly lowering defence expenditures.

Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence was conceived with a focus on deterring future wars with India. It does not take into account the multitude of internal and external threats being faced by it today. In order to transform its threat perception from being mainly India-specific, Pakistan needs to redefine its national objectives that must be consistent with its national power potential. Nevertheless, existence of nuclear capability does provide inherent strength and guarantee that the country cannot be treated like states, which do not have the military means to defend themselves.

The safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons has been a focus of international attention especially after 9/11. Several Western scholars continue to churn out scenarios depicting Pakistan as a fragile state, incapable of handling its nuclear assets.

While these concerns are mainly politically motivated, nevertheless, Pakistan has put in place an effective command and control system. Over 20,000 people are guarding Pakistan’s nuclear assets to ensure that they do not fall into the wrong hands. Likewise, the system also caters for all possible external threats to obviate the likelihood of damage or sabotage.

The history of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is a story of national resilience and tremendous sacrifices. Safeguarding it against external threats — both intellectual and physical — is a national responsibility.

Nuclear weapons combined with other elements of national power are an instrument of policy to safeguard national security interests. Possession of nuclear weapons offers significant edge in terms of enhanced political stature and diplomatic relations. It is up to the state and the leadership to formulate a strategy to exploit this potential.

Published in The Express Tribune, May 28th, 2012.