Yet (intentionally or not) North Korea has not tested a missile since it crossed the critical ICBM threshold three weeks ago. The United States (intentionally or not) has not flown a B-1B to the peninsula since the Guam threat was first issued.
There is also significant risk that a White House distracted by domestic crisis, that has little experience with diplomacy, and that has walled itself off from the State Department rank-and-file, never understood the nature of the threat to Guam or that there was an opening for restraint.
If the United States does not respond by the start of exercises next week, North Korea will likely take it as a sign that their threat was deliberately defied, and Kim could decide to order the launch.
This is precisely the kind of miscalculation and miscommunication that history tells us can lead to a war nobody wants.
This is the best opportunity the United States has had to restrict North Korea’s missile program in more than a decade. It is very possibly the Trump administration’s only chance.
If the United States fails to seize it, the missiles will continue to fly. Without a negotiated constraint, the threatened launches toward Guam may or may not occur—but North Korea will certainly continue to perfect its new ICBM.