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Introduction

On 23rd of January 2019, **Pakistan House** organized a one-day International Conference in Islamabad on " Instruments of Strategic Coercion: Theories and Implications". Ms Sana Maqbool, News Anchor at PTV World, was the Master of the Ceremony.

This event witnessed the participation of ambassadors, diplomats, policy makers, academics, civil-military bureaucrats, government officials, media personnel, university students, and other dignitaries.

General Ehsan-Ul-Haq, NI (M), (Retd), former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chairman Advisory Board Pakistan House graced the occasion as the Chief Guest.

Mr. Adrian Levy, Journalist specializing in Foreign Affairs and South East Asia, and Mr. Tariq Rauf, former Head of the Verification and Security Policy Coordination Office at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), honoured the occasion as Keynote Speakers.

The esteemed Chief Guest, keynote speakers, other dignitaries, and audience members praised the event for providing eminent speakers with a platform to deliver an

invaluable analysis on strategic coercion, its theories, and practice.

This report presents a summary of statements of the chief guest, keynote speakers, and provides with a comprehensive summary of key remarks delivered by the speakers during the conference. It also presents an analysis and policy recommendations for the state institutions.

Programme Layout

Keynote Session
Welcome Remarks by Mr. Rana Athar Javed Director General Pakistan House
Opening Remarks by the Chief Guest Gen Ehsan-Ul-Haq, NI (M), (Retd) Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Chairman Advisory Board Pakistan House
Keynote Speaker 1: Mr. Adrian Levy Journalist Specializing in Foreign Affairs and South East Asia
Keynote Speaker 2: Mr. Tariq Rauf Former Head of the Verification and Security Policy Coordination Office at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

First Session Instruments of Strategic Coercion: Implications and Solutions Chair: Mr Adrian Levy Journalist Specializing in Foreign Affairs and South East Asia	
Wars in Peace: Failure of International Order	Lt. Gen Asif Yasin Malik (Retd), HI (M) Former Defence Secretary
Reconciliation and Negotiation: Countering Strategic Coercion in Afghanistan	Amb Salman Bashir (Retd) Former Foreign Secretary
Theory of Defence Strategy & Mechanism of Peace	Dr. Shabana Fayyaz Assistant Professor at Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad

Second Session Instruments of Strategic Coercion: Nuclear Disarmament, Diplomacy and Economics Chair: Mr. Tariq Rauf Former Head of the Verification and Security Policy Coordination Office at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	
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“Doing More” as Strategic Instrument	Amb Tariq Osman Hyder (Retd) Distinguished Visiting Fellow, NDU
Nuclear Sanctions and Coercive Diplomacy	Amb Zamir Akram (Retd) Former Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva
Economic Sanctions and Instability	Dr. Ashfaque Hasan Khan Principal and Dean, School of Social Sciences & Humanities, NUST

Speaker Profiles

General Ehsan-Ul-Haq, NI (M), (Retd), former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee

General Ehsan-Ul-Haq, NI (M), (Retd), is the former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of Pakistan. During his service in Pakistan Army, he has held various important command, instructional and staff positions. As Major General he held the prestigious and important assignment of Director General Military Intelligence (1998 -2001). On promotion to the rank of Lieutenant General, he was appointed as Commander XI Corps, Peshawar which



is responsible for defence of the Pakistan – Afghanistan border and security in the Tribal areas (now districts of KPK). In the wake of the momentous events of 9/11 and intervention in Afghanistan, General Ehsan was appointed as the Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

General Ehsan-Ul-Haq (Retd) was commissioned in Pakistan Army in October 1969. He is a graduate of Pakistan Army Command and Staff College Quetta and got his masters in War Studies from the National Defence University, Islamabad.

In recognition of his meritorious services, he has been conferred the award of Hilal-i-Imtiaz (Military), Nishan-i-Imtiaz (Military), Chevalier de la Legion d' Honneur from the French Government as well as is the recipient of the King Abdul Aziz Medal of Excellence from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Adrian Levy, Journalist Specializing in Foreign Affairs and South East Asia



Mr. Adrian Levy is an internationally renowned and award-winning investigative journalist who works for The Guardian as a senior correspondent. Specializing in long-form investigative work, his pieces, most often filed from Asia, are published in The Guardian's Weekend Magazine. Levy's work has also appeared in The Observer, The Sunday Times as well as being syndicated in the US, Australia and across Europe.

Mr. Levy has also written many non-fiction books which include; *The Exile: The Flight of Osama bin Laden*, *The Meadow* and *The Siege*. He has also co-produced documentaries for the BBC and Channel 4, as well as broadcasting on BBC Radio 4 and the BBC World Service. Much of his work has been in collaboration with the journalist and author Cathy Scott-Clark.

In 2009, Levy and Scott-Clark were jointly made British Journalist of the Year at the One World Media Awards, having been British Foreign Journalist of the Year in 2004; in 2013, *Kashmir's Torture Trail*, won the Amnesty Media awards "Best Documentary".

Mr. Tariq Rauf, former Head of the Verification and Security Policy Coordination Office at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Graduated from the University of Toronto, Kings College London, and London School of Economics, Mr. Tariq Rauf became the Director of SIPRI's Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation Programme in February 2014. He was Senior Advisor to the Chair of the Disarmament Committee at the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. He is also a member of Eminent Persons



Group for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament set up by Former Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr Fumio Kishida.

From 2002 to 2011, he was Head of the Verification and Security Policy Coordination Office at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reporting to the Director General, in which capacity he dealt with high-priority verification cases involving Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, South Korea and Syria; from 2003 -2012, he was the Coordinator of Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. He was also the Alternate Head of the IAEA delegation to Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Conferences from 2003 to 2010, and the IAEA Liaison and Point-of-Contact for several multilateral control regimes and United Nations Security Council committees.

Lt. Gen Asif Yasin Malik, HI (M), (Retd), former Defence Secretary



Lieutenant General Asif Yasin Malik (Retd) is the former Secretary of Defence. Before that he served as the Chairman of Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority. During his service in Pakistan Army he held various important posts: Corps Commander XI Corps, Peshawar; Director General in Inter-Services Intelligence and Director General of Joint Intelligence and Information Operations in The Joint Staff

Headquarters.

He was bestowed the privilege of gracing the NDU's Alumni Hall of Fame in 2013 - the first Pakistani to have this honour. While at the NDU Washington DC, he was the Class President of the International Fellows. He is a graduate of Pakistan Army Command and Staff College. He has done his Master's from National Defence University Islamabad and also has a Master's degree in Strategic Resource Management from National Defense University, Washington, DC.

Amb Salman Bashir (Retd), former Foreign Secretary



Amb Salman Bashir is a Pakistani diplomat who served as the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan and as the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India. Mr. Bashir has served as the Ambassador to Denmark, Lithuania, China and Mongolia. He also did a stint at Pakistan's Mission to the United Nations in Geneva.

He served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a Section Officer (1976–1980), Director (1985–1987), Director General (1995–1999), Additional Foreign Secretary (2003–2005) and the Foreign Secretary (2008–2012). Whereas, his foreign diplomatic assignments included: Pakistan Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva (1980–1984), OIC Secretariat Jeddah (1988–1995), Ambassador of Pakistan to Denmark and Lithuania (July 1999 to February 2003), Ambassador of Pakistan to China and Mongolia (2005–2008), and High Commissioner of Pakistan to India (2012–2014).

Dr. Shabana Fayyaz, Assistant Professor at Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad




Dr. Shabana Fayyaz is an Assistant professor at the Defence and Strategic Studies department of Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad. She holds a Master's in International Studies and International Relations from the University of Birmingham and Quaid-i-Azam University. She has expertise in Terrorism and South Asia.

Dr. Shabana is also the coordinator of the Pakistan chapter of Women without Borders; member of the advisory board of Pakistan House, member of the advisory board of

Peace and Collaborative development Network and serves in editorial board of Pakistan Institute of Parliamentary Services (PIPS).

Amb Tariq Osman Hyder (Retd), Distinguished Visiting Fellow, NDU



Ambassador Tariq Osman Hyder has had a distinguished diplomatic career. He studied military and naval strategy at Oxford, and it has remained of his continuing interest and focus. He was a member of Pakistan's delegation to the Security Council during the 1971 Indo-Pak War. He helped initiate the gas pipeline from Turkmenistan project when Ambassador in Ashgabat from 1993-1998.

As Additional Secretary UN from 2002 to 2007, he participated from HQ in the UNSC 1540 negotiations policy process. In the Indo-Pakistan peace dialogue from 2004-2007, he led Pakistan's delegation for the three separate expert level talks on Nuclear CBMS, Conventional CBMS, and the Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism. He was part of the negotiations which led inter alia to setting up the hot-line between the Foreign Secretaries in 2004, the Pakistan-India Ballistic Missiles flight-testing Pre-Notification agreement of 2005, and the bilateral Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents relating to Nuclear Weapons of February 2007, which he signed on behalf of Pakistan.

He took part in formulation of Pakistan's Export Control Act, the setting up of SECDIV, and the formation of the Oversight Board for Strategic Export Controls. From 2007 to 2014 he served, as a form of public service, as the founding Expert Member of Pakistan's Oversight Board. His study on the Evolution of Pakistan's Strategic Export Controls as well as his independent study on The Future Management of Afghan Refugees and other Afghan Nationals is under preparation for publication. He has been a Member of the Directing Staff of Pakistan's

National Defence University and a Distinguished Visiting Fellow on its faculty since 2008, and the first Director of its Centre for Excellence for Peacekeeping Studies which he had established. He continues to devote much of his time to public service.

Amb Zamir Akram (Retd), former Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva

Amb Zamir Akram has served as the Pakistan Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Geneva from October 2008 to 2015. He joined the Foreign Service of Pakistan in July 1978 and has held various diplomatic assignments in Pakistan Missions abroad, including Moscow, Geneva, New Delhi and Washington and served as Pakistan's Ambassador to Nepal from August 2002 to March 2005. He has also served in a variety of positions at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Islamabad. He holds a Master's Degree in International Relations from London School of Economics.



Dr. Ashfaq Hasan Khan, Principal and Dean, School of Social Sciences & Humanities, NUST



Dr. Ashfaq Hasan Khan is the Principal and Dean, School of Social Sciences & Humanities, National University of Science and Technology (NUST). He has been the Special Secretary Finance/ Director General Debt Office, Economic Adviser Ministry of Finance, and Spokesperson of the Government of Pakistan on Economic Issues for eleven years (1998-2009). He holds a Ph.D. degree in economics from the Johns Hopkins University, USA.

Dr. Khan's experience includes: Research Economist at Pakistan Institute of Development Economics,, Visiting Lecturer at the Towson State University in USA and Visiting Fellow at the Kiel Institute of World Economics in Germany. He has also been the Consultant to many International Organizations/ Financial Institutions such as the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (UN-ESCAP), the Asian and Pacific Development Centre, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. As Consultant to the Secretary General SAARC, he had the honour of preparing the Regional Study on Trade, Manufacturers and Services which served as the foundation for regional cooperation in South Asia including the establishment of the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Welcome Address

Mr. Rana Athar Javed Director General Pakistan House



Ladies and Gentlemen, Assalam-o-Alaikum. I would like to welcome our Chief Guest General Ehsan-Ul-Haq, NI (M), (Retd), and all our speakers, foreign guests, diplomats, dignitaries, and students. Pakistan House has been engaged in holding different international conferences and seminars; the purpose of which is mostly to create new scholarship and to enrich the ongoing discussion of themes which are of great importance not only for Pakistan but for regional and international community as well.

Our seminar will be addressing the historical context of strategic coercion and the way in which Pakistan has overcome it. Principally, we consider that Pakistan has contributed to regional and international stability especially in Afghanistan. It has also taken a neutral stance on various conflicts in the Middle East. Despite the efforts made by Pakistan to achieve regional and international stability, her role has never been acknowledged; rather, it has been made to suffer in the form of sanctions, coercive diplomacy, and hybrid warfare. However, Pakistan has dealt with this strategic coercion proactively thus setting an example for other developing nations. I hope that this conference will also highlight other key issues that may be of relevance in the future.

Our Post-Conference Reports are mostly distributed to relevant strategic institutions around the world, universities, and

diplomats. Our aim is to establish new channels of communication through interaction with diplomats, academics, and experts and to seek their recommendations on international issues that Pakistan and the international community are facing.

Keynote Addresses

Chief Guest

General Ehsan-Ul-Haq, NI (M), (Retd), Former Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee



I am grateful for this opportunity to share my thoughts about a subject that is exceptionally relevant in the current international environment, our regional strategic matrix, and of course is directly concerned to Pakistan. I hope our deliberations will promote an informed and pragmatic debate on not only the conceptual aspects of strategic coercion and its applicability, but also the real-life challenges that the states subjected to strategic coercion confront.

The harsh reality of power is as old as humanity and the application of force, as a manifestation of power, is a common element in international relations. The art of state craft, diplomacy, and war have been deeply connected leading to politico-diplomatic strategies that could avoid conflicts and wars. As more than 2500 years ago, the Chinese sage, Sun Tzu observed, “To fight and conquer in all our battles is not the supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without-fighting”. This, in my view, is the essence of successful coercion or lately what is defined as the Hybrid War.

Many definitions of coercion have been offered and various terminologies have developed i.e. coercive diplomacy, military coercion, compellence, strategic coercion and deterrence. However, there is a consensus that the basic idea is the use of threat to influence the opponent’s behavior.

The inputs into the process itself may vary as follows:

1. Types of threats that the coercion may imply.

2. Role of the use of force as compared to the threat of the use of force.
3. Actors involved in the process.

The first and most overt element of coercive strategy is offensive diplomacy, directed at the isolation of the target state both in the region as well as on international forums. It is characterized by specific demand/ demands, a time frame for meeting the demands and threat of consequences in case of non-compliance.

Simultaneous with the direct diplomatic pressure, a powerful public diplomacy/information onslaught is directed at influencing global audiences, as well as influential segments within the target country on issues directly or indirectly related to the demands made. An example of direct diplomatic pressure is the case of Afghanistan, where the US has made accusations on Pakistan for providing 'safe haven' to terrorists from Afghanistan and has also criticized Pakistan for giving the United States nothing but 'lies and deceit' in return for their assistance.

Economic sanctions are another key element in a strategy of coercion. We are generally more familiar with the application of Economic coercion in Pakistan as well as other countries. The success of such measures depends on a variety of objective factors including the national resources of a state, its resilience, and its place in the international regional geo-strategic matrix. Its effectiveness must also be viewed in the dynamic transformation of the global geo-political order and rapidly fracturing post – cold war uni-polarity.

In addition to the overt diplomatic, economic and public diplomacy/information onslaught, coercion is likely to manifest in the covert domain of intelligence and subversive operations to exploit the internal fault lines in a state to trigger ethnic, political or religious conflicts. There are clearly identified elements of Hybrid Warfare in Pakistan's situation: -

1. **Physical/Security**: Low intensity warfare, religious and ethnic strife, and two-front war such as the targeting of CPEC.

2. **Cognitive:** Targeting and influencing the minds of the people and the armed forces through disinformation, deceit, propaganda and false narratives that aim to undermine beliefs, morals, mental resilience, and break the national will by installing defeatism and civil-military discord.
3. **Economic Warfare:**
The role of International Monetary Fund (IMF), Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
4. **Trade Warfare**
Evident from the anti-China campaign
5. **Erosion of Soft Power through Onslaught on Symbols of Cultural Pride and Heritage.**
6. **Exploitation of Religions Frenzy i.e. Blasphemy and Sectarianism.**

Pakistan has been a victim of coercive strategy throughout its history. Our national experience on these issues goes well beyond the theoretical exposés. We must carefully evaluate our strengths and shortfalls in the light of these experiences and capitalize on our strengths to defeat the current and projected challenges.

By preparing for these eventualities, we can effectively cope with the emerging challenges; these preparations would entail a review of a broad spectrum of national policies, strategies', and actions, which synthesizes the political, security, economic and diplomatic policies into a coherent whole. **Some of the key areas are;**

- a. Clarity on hard core national interests.
- b. National cohesion and consensus on core issues.
- c. Understanding of the emerging scenarios and the ability to foresee the challenges and opportunities.
- d. Effective consultation and decision making.
- e. Political stability, internal security and economic self-sustenance.

- f. Pro-active foreign policy.
- g. Credible national narratives.

Therefore, it is important to shun the reputation of a soft state and bring a determined investment in our internal security.

The Bottom Line: We must put our house in order rather than accuse and curse others.

Keynote Speaker 1: Mr Adrian Levy



Journalist Specializing in Foreign Affairs and South East Asia



Disinformation – Misinformation – Conspiracy or what Russians call “Kompromat” when it concerns an individual or institution – is the first instrument of coercion. Whereas, the second instrument linked to the first, would be Twitter where polarized societies, vested interest groups, nation states and the opinionated play.

However, there are more things to examine here. Taking into account one recent incident: indigenous People’s March this week in Washington DC, which clashed with pro-life rally, attended by a large group of more than 100 conservative white students from an expensive Private College, in their red #MAGA (Make America Great Again)hats, were shown mocking an indigenous American Indian. The image went viral; The Indian it transpired was a Vietnam veteran, and the entitled white students were

shouting “Build a Wall, Build a Wall” – the Mexican barrier at the centre of the US shutdown. There were also other antagonists in the frame, an African American caucus, who could be heard belittling the white students, using deprecating language.

The Social Media was alight with the claim that the black students were Muslims, so school students were being pilloried by Muslims and American Indians. By the time the story became a firestorm, it was disclosed that the African Americans were not Muslims at all but a street preaching group of Hebrew Israelites. There were four of them; Evangelicals, with a caustic style. They had clashed with 100 privileged white kids in the age of Trump, the age of the Wall, the age of Pocahontas, as Trump belittled Elizabeth Warren in a conflict that became a racially charged swearing match with the American Indian acting as intermediary – in what could be a cartoon of American life since January 2017.

Was this the work of a vested interest group that spun this out of control or was it the subjective, tribal clans of twitter in a divided polarized society? While that investigative work continues, give me a moment to throw in another historic case. Do you recall seeing the image of a Muslim woman in headscarf ignoring victims of the Westminster terror attack that went viral?

In fact, @South Lonestar, which shared the image, was identified as a Russian account as part of a US investigation into the country's influence on the 2016 presidential election. And the frame had been misrepresented as part of a nation state's mission to fracture the stressed British society.

So, framing in all these cases – by individuals and states - is what matters, and what is far more damaging or powerful than reframing, and distorting the context depending if you are the victim or perpetrator.

Pakistan has been subject of same coercion, some deserved, but much of it politically and geopolitically charged. The language that surrounds explaining Pakistan's story is now dominated by terms like 'double dealing', 'state-sponsor-of-terror', rogue state, terror state, proliferators, 'jihad factory', with the Haqqani network looming large everywhere.



And yet some of these are plain wrong, imprecise, out of context, or coined by competitors of Pakistan, coercive individuals, vested interest groups and nation states. Let's take the most damaging – "the double game". Of course, the double game – Pakistan accused of signing up to the US counter terror war and then undermining the US in Afghanistan - was a single 'foreign policy'. Pakistan's a sovereign state, which competed with America. Pakistan was never going to relinquish the right to involve itself in a neighbouring state, with a contested border, however hard the West pressed. But the dominant story was America's requirement, for which they paid, and Pakistan's failure to deliver. See the flood of stories that equate massive funding for Pakistan with its failure to deliver.

The drowning out of Pakistan's interest, the reframing of it in terms of Western interest, sits alongside other coercive tools to correct the Pakistan position as portrayed here. The array of tools deployed here are human rights indexes, narcotic indexes, and debt rescheduling – all of which aim to encourage and compel nations to tailor their policies to align with those of the West.

These were once instruments of liberal democracies, where the bi-product was portrayed to be improvements in law and order, the bolstering of judicial system, improvements in human rights and drug eradication. But now there are different tools as America takes a new

direction and conflicts with other Western powers. Presently, we are hitting the two-year mark for the Trump administration. The first year was one in which the president was walked back from various personal positions delivered on Twitter that conflicted with Grand Strategy, and he was broadly moderated by the State, the Pentagon, the Intelligence community, and his advisors.

At that time, Pakistan, after seventeen years of conflict and war, saw itself vilified as having undermined, or failed to submit to US Afghan policy – where mission creep and misalignment saw a war against Al-Qaeda as a result propping up the Northern Alliance, and perceived Indian interests, at the expense of the Pashtuns and Taliban more generally.

That vilification – saw an onslaught via social media and conventional news - where Pakistan became responsible for America's failure - even when most international experts saw the conflict as directionless and unwinnable. The instruments, aside from the reframing, then were the IMF and the FATF grey list – as well political and military isolation and threat of sanctions. To another degree pressure on Pakistan was heightened by the spate of sanctioned memoirs that belittled Pakistan's leaders, and war fighters, and demonized its institutions - polemically. They also expressed the personal frustration and disappointment of Western leaders at failing to get their position heard and implemented.

But in the second year, as the Trump administration transmuted, a clearer vision of its foreign policy emerged. Nationalism advanced over multinationalism; Narrow transactionalism, which included support for the autocrats, destruction of international treaties, the undermining of rival trading blocks. US counter terrorism changed into Competing Nation Strategy – with China and Iran in US sights.

This lurch, advanced by the Trump administration, that now ignored an interagency approach, side-lining the CIA, the Pentagon,

State, saw the administration wanting out of the post Iraq war conflicts, out of Syria,



out of Afghanistan (possibly out of NATO, and of course supporting Britain leaving the EU regardless of the damage that decision would wreak for Britain or the EU) – so the US can concentrate on its China-Iran containment; this plan now required Pakistan.

Instead of vilification and the instruments deployed, in the first year of Trump, back channels opened - whose secrecy was then deliberately breached, on Twitter and in newspapers, where a partial framing of the story was given. Pakistan which was being blamed for US failure in Afghanistan now became essential for bringing peace in Afghanistan. This was a return to a position advanced by Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, when General Ehsan-ul-Haq and a Saudi prince Faisal flew to London and Washington - where this plan was flatly rejected; a government of national unification and the separation of Taliban from Al Qaeda.

The requirements of shifting from counter terror to competing powers meant redefining Pakistan too, and in a transactional world; the

republic became a strategic partner. Interestingly, perhaps this is a more truthful relationship than all the pretence that previously surrounded the bestowing of titles. In this new world, as Foreign Affairs recently wrote, there are no permanent friends and no permanent enemies; only outcomes.

A regional bulwark through geographic, ethnic and religious fault lines, Pakistan has emerged as an essential partner right now in the containment of Iran, and the stabilization of Afghanistan –this is not a bad position to be in. By removing the moral baggage, the false selling of previous pacts, and



friendships, which have seen the US promiscuous and then abstain, from the days of Ayub Khan, via East Pakistan, to Pressler Amendment– means this republic knows where it stands, and in transactions there are, perhaps achievable, outcomes – rather than promises that will not be kept. By accepting the role, the coercive tools retract. However, one piece of this puzzle is missing. Pakistan’s narrative has been shaped externally, and the narrative space for Pakistan is narrowing as the much powerful states still dominate.

However, the blame for not hearing about Pakistan’s vital national interest and its achievements must also lie with Pakistan.

Telling your story better, finding advocates for it in the East and West, enabling researchers, academics and journalists to understand Pakistan's narrative is essential; contesting the Pakistan narrative too in think tanks and academia spaces that are currently populated by India and Central Asia, and Gulf States. Reputed colleges and institutions that are crucibles for many government policies, where Pakistan chairs, analysts and advisors are currently absent. These are Pakistan's instruments of coercion and how to deploy them is a decision that rests with Pakistan.

Pakistan lost much and won much. The cost has been prohibitive; but its history over the last eighteen years remains largely unknown.

Keynote Speaker 2:
Mr. Tariq Rauf
Former Head of the Verification and Security Policy
Coordination Office at the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA)



One definition of strategic coercion or coercive diplomacy is "getting the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force; while the adversary must still have the capacity of organized violence but choose not to exercise it". Moreover, Strategic Coercion "relies on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary's decision making but may also include limited uses of actual force".

Coercive diplomacy is also defined as the "use of threats and limited force to make an adversary halt a course of action it has embarked upon, or undo what has been done already". Furthermore, strategic coercion or coercive diplomacy can be envisaged in defensive form as "efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action" and in offensive form as "coercive threats employed aggressively to persuade a victim to give up something of value without putting up resistance."

Yet another different definition of strategic coercion or coercive diplomacy holds that it is the "credible threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny them their objectives quickly with little cost to oneself, a deadline for compliance, an assurance to the target State against future demands and an offer of carrots/incentives for compliance."

How to assess success or failure of strategic coercion

If the target State accepts the demands, without the use of force, then the threats made have been credible and successful. While on the

other hand, if the situation leads to military action or war, or if the coercing State withdraws or weakens its threats without its demands being met, or if the target State continues with its behaviour in defiance, then strategic coercion has not been successful.

Four variants of strategic coercion can be listed as: (1) try-and-see; (2) classic ultimatum; (3) tacit ultimatum; and (4) gradual turning of the screw or increasing pressure. Try-and-see rests on positing demands without a defined time limit or sense of urgency. The demander takes small coercive threats and waits to see if these persuade the opponent before going further.

In contrast, the classic ultimatum comprises three parts: the demand on the opponent; a time limit, or sense of urgency, for compliance and the threat of punishment for non-compliance. The tacit ultimatum though like the classic ultimatum differs in that the threat of force and punishment is implied.

The gradual turning of the screw or increasing of pressure is based on making threats of escalation of coercive measures from the beginning, and later incremental increase to the use of force. In practice, strategic coercion can shift from one variant to another during coercive diplomacy.

Variables or factors influencing successful strategic coercion or coercive diplomacy include: (1) Strength of motivation: based on what is at stake in a crisis, determination to act and to accept the perceived costs and risks of the action; (2) Asymmetry of motivation: the likelihood of success is greater if one's side is more strongly motivated by what is at stake than the opponent, and especially if the opponent is aware of this asymmetry in motivation; (3) Clarity of objective: clarity as to how much and what kind of force may be required, including availability of relevant military assets; (4) Sense of urgency to achieve the objectives: importance of communicating sense of urgency and determination to the opponent, and the opponent's perception of this sense of urgency to recognize the credibility of the coercive threats; (5) Adequate domestic

and international support: level of domestic and international support to back-up the diplomatic- military measures required to achieve the objectives; (6) Usable military options: availability of required offensive military capabilities to implement coercive diplomacy, together with a clear sense of the political objectives; (7) Opponent's fear of unacceptability of threatened escalation: strategic coercion is enhanced if the opponent fears unacceptable damage; and (8) Clarity concerning precise terms of the settlement of the crisis: clarity in formulation of specific demands with precise terms of settlement of the crisis or desired behaviour by the opponent.

One of the leading scholars on strategic coercion or coercive diplomacy was Alexander George, of Stanford University, who emphasized that coercive diplomacy is highly context dependent. Its effectiveness is a function of the type of provocation, the magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests, actors' images of the destructiveness of war, the degree of time urgency, the presence or absence of allies on either side, the strength and effectiveness of leadership, and the desired post crisis relationship with the adversary.

An earlier classic example of successful strategic coercion took place in December 1971, when the US deployed its nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise, along with surface ships and a nuclear-powered attack submarine (Task Force 74) in the Bay of Bengal to coerce India not to attack West Pakistan across their international border following the surrender to India of some 90,000 Pakistan military forces in East Pakistan's independence struggle to become Bangladesh. Even though the Soviet Navy sent two groups of cruisers and destroyers and a submarine armed with nuclear missiles from Vladivostok to trail US Task Force 74 into the Indian Ocean, the US' strategic coercion prevailed, and India backed off.

Other recent examples include Iraq (1998-2003), where strategic coercion failed to bring about desired behaviour change and led to a military invasion that was not sanctioned by the United Nations and which involved both war crimes and crimes against humanity by the invading forces. On the other hand, Iran (2002-2015) resisted severe politico-economic pressure from its Western adversaries in connection with its nuclear programme, it defiantly built up a full-fledged uranium enrichment capability and then agreed to a negotiated settlement in July 2015 (EU/E3+3 and Iran, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). Similarly, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), withstood strategic coercion (1992-2019 and continuing), to develop and test nuclear explosive devices and ballistic missiles, and then at the Singapore Summit with the US in June 2018 started a dialogue on removal of international sanctions and denuclearization. In this context, one should not overlook Pakistan's resistance to strategic coercion regarding its nuclear weapons programme (1979-1998).

Regarding weapons of mass destruction, it is difficult to find a case of successful strategic coercion to reverse such programmes. Possible counterfactual examples, though, could include the reversal of nascent nuclear weapon development programmes in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan because of strategic coercion supported by extended deterrence (or security guarantees).



An outlier is the case of Libya, which renounced its WMD programmes in December 2003, five days after the capture of Saddam Hussein – was it a case of successful strategic coercion in reversing a WMD programme? In this regard, however, one cannot discount the importance of diplomacy, in particular the secret negotiations between Libya and the US launched by the Clinton administration and resumed

by the Bush administration, with the assistance of the UK, and the significant role of Qaddafi's son Seif el-Islam Qaddafi.

Examples of strategic coercion in the economic domain include the re-imposition of sanctions on Iran by the US in 2018 following the latter's unilateral denunciation of the JCPOA, even though the International Atomic Energy Agency has certified in more than 12 reports that Iran is faithfully implementing the nuclear-related provisions of the JCPOA. The US' coercive goals regarding Iran include inter alia making permanent the limitations on Iran's nuclear programme and curtailing its ballistic missiles.

The ongoing trade dispute between the US and China has witnessed large scale tariffs imposed by the US, which already have contributed to a slowing of China's economy. In this case, the US aims to get China to increase its imports from the US, cease intellectual property theft and refrain from insistence on technology transfers.

Theories of Strategic Coercion

In real life, theories or hypotheses of strategic coercion or coercive diplomacy are not necessarily needed from a policy perspective – the practice itself defines the phenomenon. The literature on strategic coercion and coercive diplomacy shows the difficulties in theorizing, or strategizing, about the key factors for success other than in conditional and probabilistic terms. However, for purposes of this discussion, it is important to recognize the contribution of Alexander George, who was a professor at Stanford University, and a towering figure in theories of international relations and political science including deterrence and coercive diplomacy.

The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (1971)¹⁰ by Alexander George; Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (1974)¹¹ co-authored by George and Richard Smoke; Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (1991)¹² by George; along with Arms and Influence (1966)¹³ by Thomas Schelling and Strategic Coercion

(1998)¹⁴ by Lawrence Freedman, among others are some relevant works that shed insights into the theory and practice of strategic coercion / coercive diplomacy.

In *Arms and Influence*, Thomas Schelling assessed how best to utilize coercive diplomacy as a “bargaining power that comes from the physical harm a nation can do to another nation.” As Schelling described it, the distinction between military force and coercion is the “difference between taking what you want and making someone give it to you.”

Alexander George concurred with Schelling that strategic coercion can be utilized to affect change in an adversary’s behaviour by threatening pain and using limited force in limited amounts, in order to achieve various political objectives.

Considering the work of George and Schelling, it may be asserted that “deterrence” is a strategy deployed to dissuade an opponent from pursuing specific actions. Strategic coercion or coercive diplomacy, on the other hand, can be construed as a reaction to force a change in or reversal of activities or policies already undertaken. Compellence, as defined by Schelling, is similar to coercive diplomacy in terms of forcing or compelling an opponent to pursue a specific course of action. Thus, compellence relies on the threat of use of force or its limited use, to force the opponent to refrain from continuing with actions already undertaken or to persuade the opponent to take actions not yet begun. And, deterrence is the strategy to dissuade an opponent from undertaking a particular course of action – i.e., not to launch a nuclear attack, for example.

More recent analyses of strategic coercion maintain that key factors that influence the application of coercive diplomacy include the “operational code” of leaders, the “quality of intelligence” available and “domestic political goals”. The operational code of a leader is the cognitive and affective influences influencing their decision-making process based on their cultural background, education, economic status, life experiences, strategic culture of the State and its military strength.

These factors combined underpin the underlying beliefs and perceptions guiding a leader's decision-making process in a crisis. A leader's instrumental beliefs influence the nature of appropriate responses, while their philosophical beliefs aid in analysing the political significance of the situation. US President Donald Trump's dealings with Iran and the DPRK are illustrative in this context. Alexander George, in contrast, maintained that policy makers must individually tailor coercive strategies to suit the crisis at hand. US President George W. Bush's and Donald Trump's approaches to Iraq, Iran and China come to mind in this context.

Conclusion

The literature on and empirical evidence of strategic coercion shows that the primary factors determining success are an asymmetry of motivation favouring the coercing State, a sense of time urgency on the part of the target State, and the target State's fear of unacceptable escalation. However, none of these factors, intrinsically, is either necessary or sufficient for the success of strategic coercion or coercive diplomacy. Other factors include clarity of the demands made to the adversary, the strength of the coercing State's motivation, and adequate domestic and international support. A coercing State can create a more favourable asymmetry by demanding only what is essential for its vital interests and minimizing demands on the vital interests of the opponent, and also by offering positive inducements. Furthermore, there is no evidence that any particular combination and sequence of factors is optimal under all circumstances, but strictly coercive or bullying strategies are not optimal under most conditions.

In the post-World War II period, much of strategic coercion relied too much on military and economic threats, failed to supplement threats with sufficient positive inducements, and was often based on incorrect, misinformed and distorted images of the adversary – not surprisingly, the record of success and failure is varied, likely with more failures than successes.

While this presentation has focused on unitary actors, i.e. states as regards strategic coercion, coercive diplomacy also can be implemented through international treaty regimes, international organizations and informal self-selecting coalitions or groupings of States (such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other similar so-called export control regimes) – albeit under the dominance or coercive influence of powerful States.





"It is important to shun the reputation of a soft state and bring a determined investment in our internal security".

General Ehsan-Ul-Haq, NI (M), (Retd)



"The blame for not hearing about Pakistan vital national interest – its achievements - must also lie with Pakistan. Telling your story better, finding advocates for it in the East and West, opening to enable researchers and academics and journalists to understand the Pakistan narrative – is essential".

Mr. Adrian Levy



"How to assess success or failure of strategic coercion? If the target State accepts the demands, without the use of force, then the threats made have been credible and successful."

Mr. Tariq Rauf



"Post-World War I world order, based on strategic coercion, is losing its strength; the Chinese success in the South-China Sea and the Russian capture of Crimea are all clear manifestations of an establishment of a new multi-polar world order."

Lt. Gen Asif Yasin Malik, HI (M), (Retd)



“Pakistan has an important role to play in this peace process. But Its role is not to pressurize the Taliban, as it will be a mistake to think that the Taliban can be pressurized.”

Amb Salman Bashir (Retd)



“Strategic coercion is the combination of military mobilization and diplomacy. Focusing on the diplomatic aspects of coercion, the Mumbai parliament attack on New Delhi and the start of Indian cold doctrine against Pakistan has been a parallel coercion that Pakistan is facing from time to time.”

Dr. Shabana Fayyaz



“While deepening ties with China continues, improving relations with the US in a manner consistent with our core national interests is also vital.”

Amb Tariq Osman Hyder (Retd)



“It is being portrayed that Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities are vulnerable to attacks, and that Pakistan faces a threat to lose its nuclear weapons into the hands of terrorist groups. Not a single incident in terms of such a possibility has been demonstrated or is being claimed.”

Amb Zamir Akram (Retd)



“It is an undeniable fact that a country’s economic strength has a direct bearing on its military strength. A strong economy can ensure a strong defense, which in turn, enhances a country’s power and strengthens national security.”

Dr. Ashfaq Hasan Khan

First Session Speeches

Lt. Gen Asif Yasin Malik, HI (M), (Retd) Former Defence Secretary



Ladies and Gentlemen, I feel honoured to be here amongst an extremely scholarly panel. I must congratulate Pakistan House for selecting a fitting topic of Strategic Coercion, as Pakistan is one of the most coerced states in the contemporary times. However, Pakistan has withstood this coercion better than any other state specifically against the “do more” phenomenon. In this regard, I would like to share my personal experience as the Ex-Corps Commander Peshawar. I held the post when the operations were at their peak, and military to military interactions with the United States (US) and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) were almost fortnightly. I had regular meetings with the commanders of Afghanistan and the US and, surprisingly, not once during those two years the US military asked us to do more; it was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) using such language.

Moreover, during my visit to the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Headquarters, I did not come across the “do more” narrative. Being the front face of the Armed Forces Operations in Federally Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), I concluded from my experience that the Americans were well aware of Pakistan’s contribution, and, in fact, they were faltering to our requests to have similar operations across the border. Hence, the coercion under the mantra of “do more” was a hoax being played as a strategy that was only heard in the political circles.

Strategic coercion is very important in the background of new paradigms that have emerged in the global order in the aftermath of

First World War. The present military driven world order is the outcome of this war. Kinetic applications of strategic coercion have existed before, but they were limited to a small number of empires such as the British Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the Roman Empire. But these empires were only involved in challenging the equal or superior forces in the regard of coercive or kinetic instrument of policy. However, after World War I and particularly, after the World War II this instrument was primarily used against smaller states which were not able to react to kinetic instruments of power. As a result, millions of lives have been lost. Some instruments of coercions, even, laid the foundations of eliminating a whole race; history is full of such examples.

After eliminating the two nations, Germany and Japan, who refused to accept the USA's military might, the US was left scot-free to exploit the vulnerabilities of the smaller nations. It started with Korea then Vietnam and then followed by the other seventy-three smaller states incapable of responding to the coercive means. In each of these adventures, the US was deciding the way of life that was considered suitable for those people. The recent target Libya, which had a welfare-based system of governance, is in a stronghold of terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabab and Al-Qaeda. Another recent example is of Iraq, it is now being accepted even by the President of the United States Donald Trump that no matter how bad Saddam was, he was better in managing Iraq than it is being managed today. Now Iraq is suffering from unimaginable human and capital loss. The same situation is being observed in Syria. Due to foreign interventions, Syria is now portraying a picture of ruins; it will take hundreds of years to recover from such losses.

These countries present the failure of the new military order as millions have been killed, maimed and left homeless, but interestingly those who are being turned homeless are not taken as refugees by the interveners. All these countries are in the clutches of mayhem and disorder. They have lost their political structures and social order; their citizens are left as refugees. Pakistan, too, has been the target of strategic coercion by this new military order. It started in the year 1965

and cost the country's dismemberment so that it is not able to sustain the military and economic coercions.

The moment Pakistan realized that only the strategic capability was the guarantor of its independence from those coercions, its nuclear program was envisaged, and it started working on that program. Paradoxically, the moment Pakistan started to create guarantees for its own survival; it became the instruments of coercion against Pakistan. No other nation has survived this sort of coercion for such a long period of time as Pakistan. We can rightly be proud of the steadfastness and resilience of this nation. It is the resilience of this nation that helped it overcome the coercion that was applied against it, in all coercive manifestations. The latest manifestation is being observed in Afghanistan where Pakistan has been pressurized to an unparalleled level to take the blame for the Western failure in Afghanistan.

Post-World War I world order, based on strategic coercion, is losing its strength; the Chinese success in the South-China Sea and the Russian capture of Crimea are all clear manifestations of an establishment of a new multi-polar world order. The West has not been able to react to both these situations, and North Korea is another example of failure of strategic coercion. In case of Pakistan, as late as of August 2018, pressure was being applied on the new government through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and through other means to compromise its strategic position. This failed due to a strong policy framework put forward by the new government, and the regional support for Pakistan in overcoming its very poor socio-economic situation.



Lastly, I would like to mention that realizing their abject failure in Afghanistan and Syria, the US and the rest are on the verge of exit; we stand vindicated with our stance as back as 2001, as we had suggested a feasible solution which was not acceptable to the Western world at that moment. Now, the US and the Taliban are on the table. Hence, Pakistan must establish itself as a creative and constructive partner in the new multi-polar order. For this, setting our house in order is pivotal in the domains of our domestic and foreign policies. These policies must revolve around Pakistan and the wellbeing of the people of Pakistan. In the nuclear domain, full-spectrum credible strategic deterrence would remain pivotal for countering any future kinetic strategic coercion against Pakistan.

Amb Salman Bashir (Retd) **Former Foreign Secretary**



Thank you for inviting me to this important conference on 'Instruments of Strategic Coercion'. Since the conceptual part of the issue has been amply discussed by the other speakers, I just want to make one point as far as the theme of the conference is concerned.

From an academic view, it is important to discuss and reflect upon strategic coercion and the various situations which have emerged at present and in the history. However, as far as Pakistan is concerned, for opinion makers and leaders to continue to instil the theme of coercion and victim hood in the minds of the Pakistanis would be a mistake. During my tenure of forty years in the Foreign Service of Pakistan, with different assignments in regional and international affairs, I did not face a single situation where I felt coerced by anyone, including the great powers.

Strategic coercion is a state of mind as it is no longer possible for states to use coercive diplomacy or tool of coercion to achieve what is desired to be achieved in the first place; Because the resilience that we see all around us, is not only on the part of the Kashmiri people, but also on the part of the Afghans and the Pakistanis. Nowadays, resilience, together with the development of asymmetric warfare and asymmetric capabilities, is proven to be an effective answer to this tool of coercion. United States Senator Lindsey Graham after meeting Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, acknowledged that Pakistan had been on the correct course and that the political solution with the Taliban is the desired goal.

It has taken the US eighteen years to review their policy on Afghanistan at the apex. So, who were they trying to coerce? Were they trying to coerce Pakistan and the Taliban? Even if it was coercion, it

didn't work. They have capitulated, and the situation in Afghanistan is entering a definite stage as progress is hoped to be seen in the form of peaceful settlement. Also, in my opinion, President Trump wants to withdraw forces as he had said before his election. However, the Americans will have to take decisions with concurrence and consent of all Afghan parties notably the Taliban, and all regional neighbours. Only then we can hope for a period of stability and peace in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has an important role to play in this peace process. But its role is not to pressurize the Taliban, as it will be a mistake to think that the Taliban can be pressurized. The present focus of the efforts of US diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad and the US administration is not in the right direction too, as they are entirely concentrating on the national reconciliation which is, after all, an Afghan process. However, such political settlement is impossible until the economic issues and the economic situation of Afghanistan is addressed. They need to work towards a development of plan which incentivizes all the Afghan stakeholders, the Northern Alliances, the Taliban etc. for their livelihood and a better future. This is the first thing that ought to be done to sustain political settlement and peace in Afghanistan.



In my concluding remarks I would reiterate that opinion makers, especially the media, should lift this sense of victimhood that has been constantly instilled in the minds of the people of Pakistan. Pakistanis have proved their resilience, and their capabilities. If the Taliban have demonstrated asymmetric capabilities and the people of Kashmir have also demonstrated capabilities of resistance, then I believe a population of 220 million can do a lot.

Dr. Shabana Fayyaz
Assistant Professor at Department of Defence and
Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University
Islamabad



I would like to start with the theoretical approach towards politics with a scholarly perspective, with the question: How and why political theories work and what are the limitations of these theories?

Firstly, we need to understand what strategic coercion is. Alexander George defined coercive diplomacy as a, “defensive strategy that is employed to deal with the efforts of an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favour.”

Whereas other definitions of strategic coercion are:

1. “The use of threatened force and at the times the limited use of actual force to back up the treat to induce an adversary to change its behaviour.” (Byman and Baxman).
2. “Coercive diplomacy is a forceful persuasion. The attempt to get a target, a state or a group within a state or a non-state actor, to change its objectionable behaviour through either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force.” (Art and Cronin)

The coercer uses its influence whether it’s military, kinetic, economic pressure or the threat of suspension of the aid to make the target agree to the terms. It’s not new in international politics; this has been ongoing from the very early days of human civilization, and will be a hallmark in future as well. As the nature of coercion will change and orders will have an aggressive or forceful tone to further weaken the targets. The dominant world powers are the leading coercers.

Strategic coercion is the combination of military mobilization and diplomacy. Focusing on the diplomatic aspects of coercion, the Mumbai parliament attack in New Delhi and the start of Indian cold doctrine against Pakistan has been a parallel coercion that Pakistan is facing from time to time. Security, peace, and defence are intertwined in nature and they are very complex. It's difficult to dissect the limits where the coercion ends and where the peace begins.

Security is defined as the absence of risk and threats; it applies to all the states whether it's a dominant global or a regional player. Pakistan's defence posture has failed to maintain peace in the region and with its neighbours. State input defence as an output for peace, but it may take years to maintain peace. Same process can be applied to the situation in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been attaching its strings to Afghanistan for a long time and those strings are creating difficulties for Pakistan to achieve its strategic objectives. It also has been a target of strategic coercion by its neighbours, specifically by India, and other international powers like the United States at various points.

The strategic coercion embodies three factors:

1. Demand
2. Time
3. Threat of consequences

For example; the assembled troops on the border to give threats, just like India trying to advance its warheads and performing military exercises. Also, a threat of stopping defence equipment's from the US and it has done that at various instances. Another important issue is blocking loans through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB).

Now, I would like to shed some light on Counter-Coercion Diplomacy Model (CCDM). The present administration of the United States, apparently, seems to have forgotten the quote from one of its most celebrated past presidents, Abraham Lincoln, who said, "Force is all

conquering, but its victories are short lived.” In other words, you cannot achieve all your targets through forceful or coercive means. Proposed model of CCDM suggests Avoiding War (massive repercussions) and Make Peace (foster understanding) through engagement with the Coercer.

In the Post 9/11 scenario, US pressurized Islamabad to be on its side; General Pervez Musharraf the former President of Pakistan confessed that the US used coercive means against Pakistan. Still, the US is using coercive instruments against Pakistan in Afghanistan case, by placing Pakistan in the list of terror financing watch list. The US is involved in Afghanistan problem just to distract the other key players in Afghanistan by blocking them and by trying to coerce them through different demands.

The US State Secretary Tillerson said “Pakistan must adopt a different approach, and we are ready to work with them, protect them against the terrorist organizations, we are going to be conditioning our support for Pakistan and our relationship will depend on delivering results in this area.” This is a solid example of coercive diplomacy in Pak-US relation.

On 14 October 2017, in his statement on social media, President Trump said, “starting to develop a much better relationship with Pakistan and its leader. I want to thank them for their cooperation on many fronts.” Later, on 01 January 2018 he said “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe havens to the terrorist we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!”

Pakistan government tried to come out of this dilemma and pressure with a very solid response by the Prime Minister Imran Khan as he said, “Instead of making Pakistan a scapegoat for their failures, the US should do a serious assessment of its own failed policies in Afghanistan.”

So, there is a stream of pronouncements by Pakistani leadership to counter coerce the US coercive diplomacy.

Peace in Afghanistan is the ultimate solution to maintain peace in the region and Pakistan is playing its role and has adopted defensive policies for the protection of its state. Pakistan is acting as a medium between the US and Taliban; Peace dialogues between US and Afghanistan in Islamabad define it all. Another word, Pakistan has walked on the tight rope and has come out in a very decisive way securing its national interest that continues to be a prime policy of Pakistan.

Certain control techniques that a coercer uses are; physical coercion through brute force, economic sanctions, arm-twisting, bargaining, trade-offs, appeals to shared values and scientific proofs. And the responses to control those are; disarmament and defence, counter-disputation force, alternative interpretation, avoidance delay, bargaining, conditional agreement, full agreement and compliance.

Counter-coercive strategy (CCDM) implies a few things:

- Negotiations designed to fracture coercer support
- Taking advantage of domestic constraints in the coercer state
- Prudent use of media
- Create counter-alliances
- Highlight coercer's losses
- Increase national resolve at home



I would like to propose a few recommendations:

1. Proposed theory of defence shall be based on rational decision making and prudent cost benefit analysis.
2. SWOT – Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threat assessment is essential while responding to strategic coercion.

3. Diversifying the support base at the bilateral, regional and global level is required.
4. Defence posture should be based on proactive strategic assessment of the state incorporating internal and external dimensions.
5. Role of leadership is critical in devising counter-coercive diplomacy and overtures.



Second Session Speeches

Amb Tariq Osman Hyder (Retd) Distinguished Visiting Fellow, NDU



The the demand to do more, as an instrument of strategic coercion is relatively recent arising post 9/11 as a follow up to, 'You are either with us or against us', particularly in the context of Pakistan. However, historically the concept and practice of strategic coercion in one form or the other is as old as the history of ancient empires and their struggles and wars to expand their influence. In the 19th Century gunboat diplomacy was yet another manifestation of strategic coercion.

The object of being at the receiving end of efforts of strategic coercion is not new in Pakistan's history though this has come much more to the fore post 9/11 and in the past 15 years. Even earlier it has been subjected to such pressures because of its relative smaller size, weak economy, reliance on foreign technology and at times unstable internal polity.

There are several reasons for the accentuation of this demand to 'do more', mainly by the US in the context of helping them in Afghanistan, and by India on the counter terrorism front. There are some geopolitical shifts such as the rise and role of China as uni-polarity wanes, the position of the US to cooperate on some issues with China and to try to curtail and contain China's influence on other issues, the US's increasing tilt in South Asia towards India both in the context of China and because of the economic and commercial opportunities it offers. Pakistan on its part to resist such pressures has been drawing closer to China. As a result, Pakistan is in the cross hairs of this rivalry.

The instruments of strategic coercion that have been deployed by the US are well known. These include pressure on the IMF, FATF grey list, virtually closing off military sales, ending military training, deportation lists, freezing coalition support funds and payments due, and most lately questioning CPEC. This is in tandem with increased strategic cooperation with India with respect to military sales, support for India to join the NSG as a follow up to the US-India nuclear deal of 2005, greater access to sensitive technology, logistics and strategic communications agreements, expanded naval exercises and continuing support for India to join the UN Security Council as a Permanent Member.

Russia has moved somewhat closer to Pakistan than before, reminiscent to its reach out after the Tashkent Agreement that it brokered after the 1965 war. However, the depth of its historical and current political and defence relationship with India remains. Here is one aspect in which it is in our interests to 'do more' to get closer to Russia.

India's pressure is most directly exercised along the LOC through frequent flare-ups and cease-fire violations. Continuing with its 1947 onwards strategy, to distract Pakistan on the western front, India has changed its earlier policy of inciting Afghanistan's irredentist claims, Pakthunistan, to a direct-action policy of trying to destabilize Pakistan in Baluchistan through terrorist and insurgent actions. It continues its policy of trying to malign our image globally. Its repressive policy in Indian Occupied Kashmir is accentuated by the continuing killing of unarmed young protestors, and blinding many through a campaign of grave human rights violations; this was so egregious that it caught the attention of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and led to his critical report of 14 June 2018. Such repression is counterproductive and will also fan extremism in Pakistan and elsewhere. In every international forum including the FATF, India continues its hostile policy. Even when Pakistan's Prime Minister has called for better relations and a multi

subject dialogue to discuss all disputes and issues, including terrorism, India is not responsive.

The situation is clear; it is not enough to be a Greek chorus to decry the unfairness and unjustness of it all. The real question before us is what should be our response strategy? What are we doing and what should we be doing in our own interest? How can we gain space and time to respond and consolidate internally? We must analyse our internal constraints which make us more vulnerable to external pressure.

As far as our vulnerabilities are concerned, we are still dependent on foreign assistance, our economy is weak, our reserves low, our exports far less than our imports, tax revenue raising inadequate, lack of fiscal space, accelerating population, 65% youth bulge, high illiteracy rate, high unemployment, inadequate educational and vocational opportunities, vulnerability of youth leading to extremism, no resolve or funding for education, inadequate curriculum reform, low productivity, unskilled labour, investment mainly in services not industry, and so on.

We need to prioritize and work towards resolving these challenges. We have, by dint of blood and sacrifice, created some space by meeting to a large extent the terrorist security challenge as a result of which the travel advisories are improving and as is our image. We must turn this youth bulge truly into an opportunity.

CPEC is slowly changing the economic landscape and we need to hasten this process. For CPEC there are five areas we additionally need to focus on. Firstly, we need to negotiate agreements more diligently, to attract the large Chinese investment companies to take equity positions in many of the projects to reduce our exposure which would ensure that they are structured better, ensuring that the possibility gaming the system is eliminated. Secondly, identify Chinese industries which are no longer competitive and encourage them to relocate to Pakistan under CPEC's Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Thirdly, transform Gwadar,

which has a prime location outside the Straits of Hormuz, into not only goods and oil/gas trans-shipment centre but also a petrochemical complex by linking GCC exports and Chinese imports. This may be already happening if Saudi Arabia sets up refinery in Pakistan. Fourthly, to jump to developing links, training and synergy for our software industry with their Chinese counterparts without waiting, as now in the plan, for industries to be set up in the SEZs, much less investment and resources required than in bricks and mortar. Fifthly, more training at all levels for CPEC projects and programmes so that more Pakistanis are progressively employed.

We need to attract other investments from other countries around the CPEC catalyst. There is already visible interest; a few days back, an American diplomat mentioned that the decision by Cargill the grains, commodities and agriculture based American multinational to invest \$200 million more in Pakistan was a positive sign. The German Ambassador in interviews has also confessed that German companies are paying attention to Pakistan because of CPEC.



There are of course external and internal challenges to CPEC by countries, including India, that do not want Pakistan to strengthen its infrastructure and economy or those that have vested interests in the region. There has been criticism by some countries that have been

unwilling to provide any assistance or investment. Internally there is a constant foreign directed and funded campaign in parts of our media and more so in the social media to criticize both CPEC and its overarching One Belt One Road (OBOR) concept and projects elsewhere taking the lead from western critics and its media. At the same time, we must improve our own capacity for planning, negotiating and implementing CPEC.

The objective should include reaching an exportable surplus not just in textiles, goods and commodities, light engineering products but services in construction and education institutions abroad and software technology. Once we have more to export, we need better alignment with the key countries and regional arrangements to improve our tariff lines access without which increased export capacity would not find an outlet, apart from digital based services such as software and call centres.

Hence while strengthening of ties with China continues, improving relations with the US in a manner consistent with our core national interests is also vital. For America, currently, the road to better relations lies through Kabul. We should do all we can, again consistent with our core national objectives, to facilitate the objective of reconciliation in Afghanistan which finally now is also the US objective to allow them to withdraw completely or perhaps leaving a residual anti-terrorism force or airbase in Afghanistan. I believe that we are working towards this end as all indications show. Incidentally even if a residual US force or airbase in Afghanistan remains in an eventual agreement it would contribute to some extent to our relevance for the US.

Getting the Afghan refugees to return remains an important objective but we should recognize that for a sustainable solution to prevent further flows, we will have to also invest in the development of South and South East Afghanistan along our borders.

We have never had a truly sustained strategic relationship with the US. It could be considered as such in the beginning phases but since then has been mostly tactical in nature and is not likely to go beyond that given the US' relationship with India and rivalry with the China. A better relationship which improves our relevance to the US and by extension to its western allies in the EU and the Far East is in our



interests. The EU has also emerged as an economic and security power increasingly being forced by US policy to carve out a role for itself. Closer relations with the EU is another priority, and to attract its investments. Improved relations with the US would also have an effect on India which has been emboldened by the support of the US and other of its western allies.

We must keep on projecting our sincere desire for peaceful relations with India as it will reflect positively on Pakistan's image internationally. Earlier, we always had a constituency for peace and better relations with India and while that changed, we need to make efforts as with the Kartarpur corridor to rebuild that constituency. In time as our economy improves for that reason if no other India may consider better relations in its economic and then other interests.

In conclusion, to resist strategic coercion there is no magic bullet; there will be hard choices before us, and we need to work simultaneously on several tracks. Firstly, there is a need to increase our relevance in the region and beyond, with the US - particularly on Afghanistan in line with our core national interests. We cannot be expected to pull a rabbit out of a hat, but we need to demonstrate we are doing the most we can. Secondly, our national priority must be to make space in the next five seven years and focus should be directed to internally consolidate, to educate, train and employ our youth and to grow our economy to ensure it provides us the additional strength and resilience that we need; that is in the medium term. Completing this task is a generational challenge on which we need to embark upon without any further delay.

Amb Zamir Akram (Retd)

Former Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva



First, I would like to thank Pakistan House for inviting me to speak at this important conference.

After Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998, a prestigious think-tank in Washington invited me as a representative of Pakistan to a conference titled as 'Sanctions! Do they work?' I started by saying, "if sanctions had worked, you would not have invited me to this conference." Pakistan has gone through several years of nuclear sanctions as a part of coercive diplomacy which has been active on several other issues.

There are different kinds of sanctions; economic sanctions, military sanctions, nuclear sanctions, violation of religious rights and lack of democracy. They are considered as the key tools of coercive diplomacy. Also, there are country specific sanctions as well, for example Iran sanctions, North Korean sanctions, etc. mainly by the United States but some of those are also imposed by a few of the US allies. Then there are unilateral sanctions and bilaterally implied or multilateral implied sanctions. Sanctions applied by one or a few countries are not as effective as sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council which are international sanctions.

The practical approach of these sanctions explains their application and impacts. First, the impact of sanctions or the ability of sanctions is to achieve the objectives, depends on the commitment of the sanctioned country to resist and that depends upon the issue on which it is pursuing a policy which is being sanctioned. Now, in case of Pakistan's Nuclear Policy any sanctions whether multilateral or bilateral have

impinged on the issue of Pakistan's national security. Pakistan was determined to reject and resist those sanctions and it has continued to do so. So, the questions can be drawn as what is at stake for the country targeted? And, does the target country have any options?

Second, if the target country is totally dependent on the country sanctioning it and the target country is vulnerable, then, of course, it will succumb. But, if the target country has options, for example Pakistan, then there are chances that it will not submit. Pakistan had options of relations with china and others as well, and therefore, the impact of these sanctions was far less critical.

Third, what is the relationship and what is the course of the relationship between the country that is sanctioning and the country that is being sanctioned? Again, from Pakistan's case, the relationship with the US; Pakistan has been under sanctions and then it wasn't sanctioned when the US needed its support, and then again when it wasn't needed the US imposed sanctions.

Fourth, can sanctions for the target country be useful? As again in Pakistan's case, this has been the case. In 1990's, when Pakistan was sanctioned for the second time, it was forced to change its own perceptions and plans about its defence capabilities. The denial of the F16 aircrafts under the Pressler Amendment (620E (e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961) spurred on Pakistan's missile program. Therefore, to a great extent, the achievements that Pakistan has made in terms of its missile program are largely a result of the denial of technology and capabilities at that time.

Pakistan has gone through various phases in terms of nuclear sanctions. The 1974 nuclear tests by India created a situation which was far worse for Pakistan than it was for India. United States, in one way or the other, supported India's peace nuclear explosions. France on the other hand congratulated the Indians for their nuclear tests. But the focus shifted on to Pakistan with the result that the sanctions preceded by pressure exerted by the US on then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto. The whole host of sanctions were imposed when Pakistan refused to back down and continued to pursue clandestinely.

There were Solarz Amendments, Glenn Amendments, and Symington Amendments designed to deny Pakistan's ability to proceed with its program and even the nuclear cooperation agreement. The reprocessing plant that Pakistan had negotiated with France was cancelled as a result of American pressure on the French. Canadians stopped the supply of nuclear fuel for Pakistan's nuclear reactor in Karachi Nuclear Power Complex (KANUP). And that again is another example of how it worked to Pakistan's advantage because that developed the capability to run its KANUP reactor on its own despite the Canadian ban.

Coming to the next phase, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in the end of December 1979, a new relationship emerged between Pakistan and the US. That's when US cooperated with Pakistan against Soviet Union which provided Pakistan the strategic space to develop Nuclear Weapons Program. It was at the end of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan when the Soviets withdrew, and the US didn't require Pakistan's assistance as it had before the second phase of US sanctions were imposed. In October 1990, the denial of economic and military assistance and de-freezing of military equipment worth over \$600million took place.

Some members of the US senate saw this unfairness and tried to rectify the situations in 1994-95. As a result, Brown Amendment was adopted which released some of the economic assistance and enabled the repayment of some of the money that Pakistan paid for the weapons. But again, in May 1998, nuclear tests by Pakistan brought it back to the ambit of nuclear sanctions. Then the entire focus of not just the US but the entire western world was on Pakistan, trying to persuade, not to conduct a nuclear test in retaliation or in response to Indians. That pressure, however, did not work. The inducements given to Pakistan could not also convince and this situation remained until September 11, 2001, at which point, of course, the US again needed Pakistan's

assistance and the sanctions that had been imposed on Pakistan were waived under the National Security Clause or National Security Waiver under the authority of the US President.



India's alliance with the US against China resulted in the "123Agreement" adopted by American Congress which set the stage for the waiver that was provided to India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). A sense of exceptionalism where by India, despite its acts of proliferation, was rewarded the opportunity to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation with the rest of the world. The Indo-America strategic corporations/ Defence Corporation has enhanced India's military ability, both in the conventional and strategic fields that today it is in a position of posting triad delivery systems, a fast-developing ballistic missile defence system. As a consequence, Indians now feel superior and are inclining towards a strong position to consider a conventional war despite the existence of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan. It is clearly articulated in India's Cold Start Doctrine, and more recently Indians have started talking about the possibility of carrying out pre-emptive strike against Pakistan. With the capabilities that India has, as well as a ballistic missile system, once it is fully operational, would enable them to carry out a pre-emptive strike.

Pakistan is being asked to demonstrate the restraint, even if it is unilateral restraint in the development of its short-range missile such as 'Nasr' as well as in the development of long-range missile such as Shaheen I and II. It has been accused of having the fastest growing nuclear weapons program even though its capabilities are nowhere near India in terms of producing nuclear weapons. It is being portrayed that Pakistan's nuclear capabilities are vulnerable to attacks, and that Pakistan faces a threat to lose its nuclear weapons into the hands of terrorist groups. Not a single incident, in terms of such a possibility, has been demonstrated or is being claimed.

It is important to recognize that while the US and its allies talk of a roll back of Pakistan's nuclear program after its nuclear tests in 1998 but after September 11, 2001, they claim that they are no longer asking for roll back rather for freeze. The US and its western partners have not reconciled to the fact that Pakistan has nuclear weapons, so Pakistan should never lower its guard. The safety and security measures that it has put in place to protect its strategic capabilities need to be considered. In the end, I would like to remind that the authorities have claimed that the US needs its military presence in Afghanistan, apart for other things, to keep check on Pakistan's nuclear capabilities.

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I would like to thank Mr. Rana Athar Javed, Director General Pakistan House, for inviting me to speak on this very important subject.

In today's environment there is a very low probability of an interstate conflict since it results in huge losses of a country's financial, political and military resources; the nature of warfare has changed. At the present, the political, economic, civilian and informational instruments of power are being used to exploit the vulnerabilities in other states. This strategy of warfare is known as the Hybrid Warfare.

It is now being utilized to achieve political objectives that are not possible through direct military interventions. A state engaging in hybrid warfare foments instability in another state's domestic affairs by using the techniques of cyber warfare and influence operatives in conjunction with economic pressures, support to local opposition groups, disinformation and criminal/terrorist activities. The objective of hybrid warfare is not to destroy, but to disrupt the political system of the targeted country making it difficult to govern.

Hybrid warfare employs unconventional tactics such as cyber-attacks, economic coercion, sabotage and dissemination of forged information through print and electronic media. One of the most significant elements of hybrid warfare is the media propaganda. It uses disinformation in the form of false news, defamation of political, military and judicial leadership, intervention into foreign electoral systems and weak diplomacy as propaganda devices.

Pakistan is in the menace of these propaganda devices as well. From the manipulation of data to the foreign electoral interventions, its national vulnerabilities are being exploited. Renowned international organizations are involved in the manipulation of Pakistan's economic and financial data.

In the economic coercion, the manipulation of economic data obscures a country's economic strength. Many international mapping and rating agencies are degrading Pakistan's economic capabilities with these instruments of economic coercion. This economic sabotage is to undermine Pakistan's economy. When Pakistan's economy was growing by three or three-point five (3.5) percent per annum, it was regarded as the country with bad governance and declining economy, so that it will ask for financial support from international financial institutions. However, after few years, when Pakistan's economy was growing by seven to eight percent, then it was named as the opportunity country, this practice of economic sabotage affects the foreign policy of a country.

Economics as an instrument of hybrid warfare - How a powerful country achieves its political objectives from the target country

The strategy works in the following manner; first, the powerful country selects a political leader or a political party that would serve its interests in the target country. Then, it supports the leader or the party through political, diplomatic, financial means, and international print and electronic media as well. Second, if the party wins the election and comes to the power, economic coercion and sabotage as an instrument of hybrid war begins to take shape by appointing a weak Finance Minister and a Central Bank Governor that results in the weakening of key economic institutions such as Ministry of Finance, Planning Commission and Ministry of Commerce. As bad governance becomes a norm in that target country, it leads to the active role playing of the international and national consultants, because of the incapacitation of the public offices.

The powerful country continues to provide financial support to the target country, indirectly, through international financial institutions, international debt capital markets etc. with an objective toward them off from implementing wide-ranging structural reforms. Targeted country continues to acquire huge debts and in the process its economy continues to deteriorate. That country ultimately goes to the lender of the last resort and loses its financial sovereignty, and the objective or the desire of making development policies fades away. That country would be implementing the economic policies formulated by those international financial institutions, rather formulating its own. In the result, the “economic hitmen” deliberately weaken that country’s economy through unsuitable policies, bad governance, and corruption. Hence, the economic sabotage has worked successfully as an instrument of hybrid warfare. It all leads towards the social and political unrest in the country. All economic coercion and sabotage instruments are employed to make the government unpopular in the masses.

Pakistan is in the midst of hybrid warfare for the last one decade, but the pace of war has accelerated in the last four to five years. The people of Pakistan have not yet realized this because of the ambiguous nature of the hybrid warfare. We are shrouded with misinformation and deception.

It is an undeniable fact that a country’s economic strength has a direct bearing on its military strength. A strong economy can ensure a strong defence, which in turn, strengthens a country’s power and national security. Weak economy generates violence, conflicts and political turmoil. According to Paul Kennedy – a British historian specializing in the history of international relations and economic power – “a nation’s military strength rests on its economic strength.”

I would like to conclude my speech with a quote from Robert McNamara, former United States Secretary of Defence; “Security means development and without development there is no security.”



Analysis & Recommendations

Analysis:

The ensuing analysis of speeches reflects that strategic coercion is an important phenomenon in current world order since the chances of inter-state armed conflict have decreased substantially; strategic coercion is a scheme used by greater powers (targeting state or coercing state) against developing and weak states (target state) to achieve their objectives and halt a sovereign action, which is against the strategic interest of the greater power. If the target state/states conform to the demands, without the use of conventional means, the strategic coercion is considered to be successful. However, if the clash of interest leads to conventional war, or the targeting state lowers the threat levels, or if the targeted state continues its aspirations unhindered, the strategic coercion is believed to have failed.

Moreover, strategic coercion embodies three factors: demand, time, and threats of consequences. The coercing state lay down specific demands, and the targeted state is expected to respond positively within a specific time frame or else will be subjected to consequences in the form of sanctions, regime change etc. - as was manifested against Iraq, Libya and Syria, where specific demands were placed by the United States, and on non-compliance these states faced repercussions. However, in all these cases, the coercive strategies failed, and the conventional means were adopted to accomplish demands and objectives.

Pakistan has been subjected to strategic coercion repeatedly at the hands of US and her allies, despite being an ally, both during the cold war era and in recent times. Firstly, in forms of nuclear sanctions such as Solarz Amendment, Glenn Amendment, and Symington Amendment; secondly, in form of

economic and military sanctions, and thirdly, in form of coercive diplomacy under the umbrella of “doing more” in Afghanistan. Moreover, since its independence, Pakistan also faces strategic coercion initiated by India who is involved in supporting disrupting elements within Pakistan as was evident in Eastern Pakistan in 1971 and presently in Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Gilgit-Baltistan and Karachi. Although, Pakistan has withstood all coercive attempts due to the resilience of its people and institutional strength, yet it must revisit and reconsider its strategic posture to fully utilize the opportunities it has and tackle the challenges it is to face pre-emptively.

Recommendations:

Pakistan's geo-strategic posture must be instituted on rational decision-making based on cost-benefit analysis models and proactive strategic assessment of the present scenario. Economically, Pakistan should strive to gain long-term economic strength and independence whereas politically its decision-making process shall involve deliberative consultations with all key stakeholders. Moreover, it shall diversify its support base at the bilateral, regional, and international level. The following recommendations for policy practitioners and concerned quarters are proposed:

- **Formation of a grand strategy**

The Government of Pakistan shall form a grand strategy on issues of national importance. Formation of such strategy must involve strategic appraisal of regional and international setting. While the decision making in this regard must be based on recommendations of experts and all relevant stakeholders.

- **Engagement with international universities and think-tanks**

The Pakistani youth must be encouraged to join international universities and policy think-tanks to highlight the Pakistani narrative abroad and to counter the maligned image of Pakistan that has been globally constructed by the influence of Indian narrative. Efforts should also be made to engage with the Pakistani diaspora settled in the West to

effectively present the narrative of Pakistan to a larger international audience in the political sphere.

- **Projecting Pakistan as a proponent of peace**

Pakistani media can play a significant role in projecting Pakistan's stance on promoting peace with regards to its relations with India. This narrative will not only improve Pakistan's image in regional dynamics but also send a positive image internationally; this is extremely significant for countering Indian propaganda whereby Pakistan is being falsely accused of harboring terrorism in the region.

- **Regional countries must collaborate in Afghan Settlement**

The collaboration of regional countries in settlement of Afghan crisis is necessary because the future of Afghanistan will affect the neighbourhood. Pakistan can play a vital role in mediations and hence, must initiate efforts to convince regional countries to sit on the negotiation table with the Afghan stakeholders, to achieve a peaceful settlement that is owned by the Afghan people and which is also in the interest of the region.

- **Gaining economic independence**

In the emerging Geo-Economic World Order, it is highly important for Pakistan to gain the much-sought economic independence. To ensure its security, Pakistan must achieve its financial sovereignty by fully utilizing its own sources of production while initiating the structural reforms

that are in the best interest of its citizens; instead of relying on IMF and other international financial institutions that have strict terms and conditions, causing a risk for Pakistan's security and sovereignty.

- **Strengthening financial and legal frameworks to curb the activities of anti-state actors**

The Government must formulate a comprehensive strategy to strengthen its legal framework in order to control money laundering, illicit financial activities and the rising power of non-state actors who are involved in subversive activities in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.

- **Strengthening ties with China**

There is a dire need for Pakistan to further strengthen its economic ties and bilateral relationship with China to enhance its significance in the region, and to counter the growing combined influence of the trio (India-Iran-Afghanistan) which is cooperating in economic and military realms in an effort to eventually isolate Pakistan. Pakistan can eliminate the threat of regional isolation through wholehearted participation in CPEC and by undertaking miscellaneous bilateral projects with China to create a balanced relation with other powerful countries as well.

- **Pro-active foreign policy**

Instead of managing foreign affairs reactively, the Foreign Office of Pakistan must develop a foreign policy document on basis of consultations in order to take pro-active decisions in international affairs.

Photo Gallery







